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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ect of competition on the reputation
mechanism in the market for information intermediaries such as rating
agencies. I use a dynamic model to endogenize the value of reputation to
enable comparison of equilibria under di¤erent market structures. Behav-
ior is determined in the model by weighing the current rating fee against
the future value the rating agency derives from enjoying a good reputa-
tion. I show that competition weakens the reputation mechanism, and
thus worsens the quality of information by reducing the value of a good
reputation but not the short-term gain of lying.
Information intermediaries can potentially alleviate the problem of asym-
metric information. Credit rating agencies convey information about creditwor-
thiness of an issuer of nancial product; certication bodies such as standard-
setting organizations convey information about whether a product or production
process satises certain properties. The value of these agencies relies on their
ability to credibly convey information about the product they rate.
An information intermediary has a conict of interest when it is paid by
the sellers whose products it evaluates. This issue in the credit rating industry
has received considerable public attention in the wake of the recent nancial
crisis. A report by Levin and Coburn (2011) documents how analysts are under
pressure to adjust models to give clients a desirable rating in order not to lose
business. Gri¢ n and Tang (forthcoming) show that a top US rating agency
frequently adjusts, often upward, the rating its own model predicts.
Such conict of interest can be mitigated by concern for reputation. If an
intermediary delivers poor information, then its ratings will not be highly valued
by market participants in the future, and thus it will be unable to charge a high
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fee for its services. S&P explicitly mentions its ongoing value of credit ratings
business as cost to counter short-run incentives to inate ratings.1
There seems to be widely-held belief that competition improves the quality
of the information that is delivered in the credit rating industry. One goal of
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was to increase competition in
this industry by making the requirements for becoming a Nationally Recognized
Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSRO) more explicit. Richard A. Posner
proposes eliminating the status of NRSRO altogether to increase competition
because market discipline should mitigate conict of interest.2 However, an em-
pirical study by Becker and Milbourn (2011) suggest that increased competition
in the rating industry results in more issuer-friendly ratings and degrades the
quality of information. Levin and Coburn (2011) document incidences suggest-
ing that concern over market share and the threat of losing deals to a competitor
may compromise ratings quality.
This paper investigates whether competition strengthens or weakens repu-
tation mechanism among information intermediaries. I employ a fully dynamic
model of reputation in which the value of reputation in each period is endoge-
nously determined by the market structure. I build on the monopoly model
proposed by Mathis et al.(2009) by adding a fee-setting stage to capture com-
petition. I nd that competition reduces market e¢ ciency by causing an agency
to lie more often.
As in Mathis et al.(2009), I consider a nancial market in which, in every
period, a new rm wishes to issue securities to nance a new project. The
payo¤ to this rm depends on investors beliefs about its project. A rating
agency observes the quality of the project and issues a good or bad rating. Some
agencies are honest and always report the true quality. Others are opportunistic
and provide any report that will maximize its discounted sum of the per period
payo¤. An agencys reputation is the probability that other market participants
believe it to be honest. The rm chooses to obtain a rating from one or no agency
after learning the fees each agency charges.
In equilibrium, a project with a bad rating will not be nanced, and thus the
agency will not be paid because fees are transaction based. An opportunistic
agency thus has a short-run incentive to lie in order to receive the rating fee it
charges. If it lies, however, it will lose all of its reputation and, as a result, all
of its future business. Thus, the cost of lying is the value of a good reputation
earned by giving a bad rating. In equilibrium an agency will always lie with
positive probability if there are enough bad projects or if the agency is not
patient enough. The probability with which it lies is such that the agency is
indi¤erent between lying and not lying. It is the probability at which the two
curves in Figure 1 intersect.
Under monopoly, the agency leaves zero surplus to any rm, and charges a fee
equal to the value of its good rating. Thus, the benets of lying are simply the
1 It is in a statement S&P made in 2002 to SEC. See
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/standardpoors.htm>
2See http://www.nreg21.com/lombard-street/the-presidents-blueprint-reforming-
nancial-regulation-a-critique-part-ii
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Probability of Lying
value of the monopolists good rating. The bulk of an agencys prots come from
rating good rms. Firms with bad projects are actually hot potatoes. Although
an agency gets paid a rating fee when it lies for a bad rm, its future value of
business su¤ers as a result of doing so. Thus, the surplus from trade with a bad
rm is nil as long as the agencys reputation is not close to perfect. Therefore,
competition cannot further drive down the surplus to reduce the temptation of
lying. Competition does, however, erode the more protable business of rating
good rms, thereby reducing the value of having a good reputation, and thus
the costs of lying. Because competition does not change the benets-of-lying
curve, but lowers the cost-of-lying curve, competition causes an agency to lie
more often, and thus reduces the value of its good ratings (see gure 1).
0.1 Literature Review
Bolton et al.(forthcoming) adopt a static model with an exogenous value of
reputation and a fraction of naive investors to examine the phenomenon of
ratings shopping. They extend the model to a two-period model to endogenize
the value of reputation in the rst period, and show that market e¢ ciency is
lower under duopoly because it facilitates ratings shopping. The two-period
model provides tractability for analyzing the comparative statics of a host of
other interesting issues. In contrast, this paper is able to build a fully dynamic
model in which the value of reputation is endogenous in every period by focusing
solely on the reputation mechanism and abstracting away from ratings shopping.
I assume that all investors are rational and correctly interpret a rating given their
expectation of a rating agencys equilibrium behavior. In the model employed
by Bolton et al.(forthcoming), competition does not make an agency lie more
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or less often. It is the issuers better ability to pick the best rating and fool
naive investors that make a duopoly perform worse. In my model, competition
worsens e¢ ciency because agencies lie more often under duopoly than under
monopoly. Therefore, my paper is complementary to theirs by pointing out a
di¤erent channel through which competition worsens e¢ ciency.
Camanho et al.(2010) also extend Mathis et al.(2009). In contrast to this
paper, they assume that rating fee is exogenous and does not depend on market
structure. They use numerical examples to argue that duopoly tend to increase
ratings ination.
The literature on the e¤ect of competition on the reputation mechanism
typically focuses on the existence of equilibria in which the strategic long run
player always takes the good action and the incentives to take the bad action
are independent of market structure. Klein & Le­ er (1981), Strausz (2005),
and McLennan and Park (2005) all show that reputation mechanism acts as
entry barrier, which is why the industry is a natural monopoly or can only
accommodate a handful of rms. In their models, adding another agency ei-
ther has no e¤ect on e¢ ciency, or makes the entire industry collapse. Horner
(2002), on the other hand, shows that competition among sellers in a product
market enhances reputation concern and improves product quality because it
improves consumersoutside options and therefore heightens the threat of losing
reputation.
Another line of research concerning certication agencies studies the opti-
mal rating rule, assuming that the agency can commit to a disclosure rule and a
rating-contingent fee schedule. Lizzeri (1999) shows that the prot-maximizing
rating rule for a monopolist agency is a pass-fail system that reveals only whether
a product has positive or negative value to the consumer. But competition may
lead to full information revelation. In contrast, considering truthful agencies
and renegotiation-proof contracts, Faure-Grimaud et al (2009) show that com-
petition may reduce information disclosure. Their model provides a story why
competition may cause agencies to optimally give up a section of the market
with lower willingness-to-pay for a rating.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 1, I set up the model and
describe the solution concept. In Section 2, I solve for the equilibrium under
monopoly. In Section 3, I analyze the duopoly case and compare e¢ ciency in
the two market structures. In Section 4, I discuss the assumptions about the
model setup. Section 5 concludes.
1 Model Setup
My model builds on the monopoly model in Mathis et al.(2009) with an addi-
tional fee-setting stage to capture competition.
In every period t = 0; 1; 2; :::, a short-lived rm wishes to seek funds for an
investment project by issuing a security. The project can be good or bad. The
rm knows the quality of its project, but potential investors do not. The latter
hold a prior belief that the project is good with probability . The rms payo¤
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from the nancial market is w (p) if investors believe the project to be good
with probability p. I assume that no one would invest in the rm and no issue
would take place if the investors beliefs about the rm were no better than
p  . For p > p, the rms nancial-market payo¤ w (p) is strictly increasing
and continuous in the investorsbelief p. In addition to being a¤ected by the
price of debt the rm has to pay, w (p) can also reect the amount of nancing
the rm is able to receive.
Rating agencies are long-run players whose payo¤s are represented by the
discounted sum of stage game payo¤s with a discount factor  2 (0; 1). The set
of rating agencies is I = f1g under monopoly and I = f1; 2g under duopoly.
The agencies perfectly observe the quality of the new investment project when
it arrives and can communicate that quality to the market by issuing a rating.
A rating agency may be either honestor opportunistic.An honest agency
cannot lie, i.e., it can only issue a good rating to a good investment project
and a bad rating to a bad project. An opportunistic agency will lie if doing so
increases its payo¤. The investors, rms, and competitor rating agency share a
common prior about agency i and observe the same past history. Therefore, at
the beginning of each period, they hold the same belief about agency i. Denote
by qi the probability that these parties believe agency i to be honest.
Within a given period, the game proceeds as follows.
1. A rm arrives with a new investment project of quality v 2 fg; bg. Both
the rm and the agencies observe v.
2. Bertrand competition in rating fee:
(a) Rating agencies simultaneously post their rating fee i.
(b) The rm decides whether to obtain a rating and, if so, which rating
agency to obtain it from.
3. Rating choice: If the rm chooses to approach agency i, then agency i
publishes a rating m 2 fGi; Big.
4. Payo¤ realization and belief updates:
(a) The market observes the rating or the lack thereof: m in [i2I fGi; Big
or f;g, where ; denotes no rating. The investors then form a pos-
terior pm about the quality of the project. If w (pm) > 0, then the
rm issues the securities and obtains w (pm) from the nancial mar-
ket, and it pays i to agency i. The net payo¤ to the rm is thus
w (pm)   i, and the agency receives i in this period. Otherwise,
securities are not issued and fees are not paid. Both the rm and the
agency receives 0.
(b) If securities are issued, then the investors learn the projects quality v
ex post. Otherwise, the project is aborted, and investors never learn
its quality. Let o denote everything the market observes. Then, at
the end of the period, the investors update their beliefs about the
rating agency to o = (oi )i2I .
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1.1 Information Intermediaries that Receive Commissions
This game can also be modied to model information intermediaries that re-
ceive commissions  fees per transaction. The conicts of interests in these
industries are even more obvious: if the intermediary has any inuence, then
a recommendation (a good rating) will result in higher sales and thus a higher
current period payo¤. In every period, there is a new product that is either
good or bad. The agencies know the quality of the product and post the com-
missions they charge simultaneously. There is a continuum of buyers of mass 1.
If the rm chooses to sell through agency i, then agency i publicly announces
its recommendation m 2 fGi; Big. Although it would be more realistic for an
agency to give recommendations individually to each buyer, because it would be
caught lying if it recommended a bad product to a positive measure of buyers,
in equilibrium the agency will either recommend a product to all buyers or none
at all. We can thus assume without loss of generality that the agency publicly
announces one recommendation to all buyers. If w (p) is the fraction of buyers
who will purchase the new product if it is believed to be good with probability
p, and if the posterior of a product with a bad rating is no better than its prior,
then a product with a bad rating will have zero sales, and thus the agency will
receive no commissions in the current period if it issues a bad rating.
1.2 Strategies, Beliefs and the Solution Concept
The solution concept used in this paper is symmetric Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium. That is, every players behavior within a given period depends on the
history only through the reputation prole of the agencies and not on the names
of the agencies.
Let (qi)i2I denote the reputation prole at the beginning of the period.
After observing the quality v of the project, agency i of type ti posts a fee
vi (q; ti). When the fees the agencies charge are (i)i2I , a rm with a good (bad)
project believes that agency i is honest with probability gi (i) (
b
i (i)), and
will approach agency i with probability i (; q) (i (; q)). An opportunistic
agency i chooses to give a good rating to a good (bad) rm with probability
yi (i; q) (xi (i; q)). Let (

i (q) ; 

i (q)) be the rms behavior after equilibrium
fees are posted, and (xi (q) ; y

i (q)) agencys is behavior when a rm approaches
it at its equilibrium fee.
Investors believe that a rm rated by agency i is good with probability i (q).
All other market beliefs are in the description of the game.
Denote by Vi (q) the equilibrium payo¤ of the opportunistic agency i from a
given period onwards when the reputation prole at the beginning of the period
is q. It is the discounted sum of the rating fee it expects to receives in every
period. As in Mathis et al.(2009), I focus on active equilibria, where an agency
receives a positive payo¤ unless it is believed to be opportunistic. In addition,
under duopoly, I focus on equilibria where there is active competition, and no
agencys good rating is believed to be worthless simply because all of the rms
it rates are believed to be bad.
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Denition 1 An equilibrium is active if Vi (q) > 0 and i (q) > 0 for all q 2
(0; 1)
jIj.
I consider only fee-pooling equilibria in which the rating fee agency i charges
does not depend on its type, and investors belief about an agency does not
depend on the identity of the rater or the lack thereof. Therefore, investors
belief about agency i does not change if i does not publish a rating. Denote
agency is equilibrium fee strategy by vi (q). In such an equilibrium, neither
the rating fee or the act of rating itself has any signaling value; only the rating
chosen has such value. Considering only fee-pooling equilibria helps us to focus
on competitions e¤ect on the trade-o¤ an agency faces when it considers lying
while, at the same time, being able to capture competition via the fee-setting
stage. It also facilitates comparison with Mathis et al.(2009). In their model,
agencies do not set their own fees, and naturally rating fees cannot be used as
signals. Because rating fees are the only strategic choices of an honest agency,
the analysis centers on the opportunistic agency. Unless specied otherwise, an
agency refers an opportunistic agency.
Interpreting Mathis et al.(2009) in the setup of this model, it is as if they
implicitly assume that investors believe a rm approaches the monopolist with
probability 1. I thus focus on equilibria in which, in a sense, the probability that
a rm obtains a rating is at a maximum. That is, a rm will obtain a rating for
sure, if it is indi¤erent between doing so and not, and an agency that rates it
strictly prefers the rm to do so. Consistent with the assumption in Mathis et
al (2009) that an unrated security is not nanced, I impose a condition on the
o¤-equilibrium-path belief that if no rms are unrated in equilibrium, then an
unrated rm is not nanced.
Denition 2 An equilibrium has maximum coverage if
1. a rm of type v obtains a rating with probability 1 if it is indi¤erent be-
tween obtaining a rating or not, and an opportunistic agency that rates
the rm in equilibrium with positive probability strictly prefers that this
rm approaches it rather than obtaining no rating or a rating from its
competitor; and
2. w
 
p;

= 0 if no rms are unrated in equilibrium.
The following two conditions rule out weakly dominated behaviors and dis-
cipline out-of-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. They are only used under duopoly.
Consider a Markov Perfect equilibrium, construct its reduced Bertrand com-
petition game at reputation prole q where each agencys payo¤ from a fee pro-
le 0 is the sum of its current period payo¤ (resulting from 0 and the equilib-
rium behavior ( (:; q) ;  (:; q) ; x (:; q) ; y (:; q))) plus the discounted future payo¤
(given by the equilibrium market beliefs o and the equilibrium value function).
Say that a MPE is weakly undominated if each agencys equilibrium fee strategy
is weakly undominated in its reduced Bertrand competition game at q, for all
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q. I use this condition so that an agency will not charge a fee below the value
it receives from not rating the rm.
To connect the value of an agencys good rating to its equilibrium behavior
even when this agency issues no rating in the current period, I impose a rating
consistency condition as follows.
Denition 3 A Markov Perfect equilibrium strategy prole  = (; ; ; x; y)
together with its corresponding belief system  satises rating consistency if there
exists a sequence of Markov strategy proles

k; k; 
g
i;k; 
b
i;k; xi; yi

i2I

k
and beliefs fkgk such that, for every k 2 N, (1) agency is fee strategy vi;k
has full support on [0;1), for v = g; b and i 2 I, (2) a rm randomizes strictly
among all rater choice i 2 I [ f;g that maximizes its payo¤ given (x; y) and
equilibrium belief system , (3) the belief system k is derived from k by Bayes
update, and (4) (k; k)! (; ).
This condition is used only under duopoly when an agency may not rate
any rm in a given period. The tremblingin the fee an agency proposes and
among all raters that are optimal for a rm disciplines the investors beliefs
when an o¤-the-equilibrium-path rating is observed.
In the remainder of the paper, equilibrium refers to a weakly undominated
symmetric Markov Perfect equilibrium that is active, fee-pooling, has maximum
coverage, and satises rating consistency. I discuss the implications of the as-
sumptions in Section 4.
2 Monopoly
My monopoly model di¤ers from that in Mathis et al.(2009) mainly in the
agencys ability to set its own fee. I show that monopoly power implies that
the agency will leave zero surplus to the rm and charge a fee equal to the
value of the agencys good rating. Given this observation, I can then use similar
arguments as under Mathis et al.(2009) to obtain the unique equilibrium.
I rst focus on the opportunistic agency and the rm. I construct and show
the uniqueness of their behaviors in equilibrium. Because I look at fee-pooling
equilibria, I establish existence by checking that the fee the opportunistic agency
charges is also optimal for the honest agency. Unless specied otherwise, an
agency refers to the opportunistic agency.
In the monopoly case, I use notation without subscripts. For example, pG (q)
is the investorsbelief about a rm with a good rating from the monopolist with
reputation q, and x (q) is the probability an opportunistic monopolist lies when
its reputation at the beginning of a given period is q.
2.1 Preliminaries
In this section, I show that an opportunistic agencys cost of lying is its dis-
counted future value after giving a bad rating, V
 
B

, because its future
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value drops to zero once its reputation drops to zero. I also show that an op-
portunistic agencys benets of lying is the value of its good rating, w
 
pG

, by
establishing that a rm gets nanced if and only if it receives a good rating,
and thus an agency gets paid only if it issues a good rating.
We rst observe that a monopolist known to be opportunistic has zero value
because it has an incentive to give every rm a good rating to ensure that
securities are issued and the agency is paid. But this agency is unable to provide
any information, and so securities are not issued even if a rm gets a good rating.
Lemma 4 An agency with zero reputation has zero value: V (0) = 0.
Next, we see that the rm will get nanced if and only if it obtains a good
rating. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 5 Only a good rating has positive value. That is, w
 
pG (q)

> 0 for
all q > 0, but w
 
pB (q)

= w
 
p; (q)

= 0 for all q  0.
Because a bad rating has zero value, and thus no securities will be issued
for it, an agency gets paid if and only if it gives a good rating. Therefore, the
only valuable goodthe agency can sell to a rm is its good rating. The cost
of this goodis
cv = V
 
B
  V  Gv
when the rms project is of quality v. If the agency publishes a good rating,
then the project will be nanced, and its quality is observed ex post. Thus,
the agencys reputation at the beginning of next period is Gv. If the agency
publishes a bad rating instead, the project will not be nanced, and its quality
not observed; thus the agencys reputation at the beginning of the next period
becomes B regardless of rm type. The cost for the agency to provide a good
rating to a type v rm is the di¤erence in the discounted value of its future
reputation from publishing a good rating instead of a bad one. Then, the
agencys cost of lying is
cb = V
 
B

because lying is always detected, Gb = 0, and V
 
Gb

= 0 by lemma 4.
It follows immediately that issuing a good rating is cheaper for a good rm
than for a bad rm:
cg < cb, (1)
because Gg > 0 and thus V
 
Gg

> 0 by the active condition.
Because obtaining a bad rating or no rating both give a bad rating both give
the rm zero payo¤, a rms willingness-to-pay for the agencys good rating is
the value of investorsbelief pG, i.e., w
 
pG

. Because a monopolist will leave
zero surplus, it will charge
v = w
 
pG

(2)
for both types of rms. Thus the agencys benet from lying is the value of its
good rating.
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It follows from (1) that the surplus from trade, w
 
pG
  cv, is higher when
the rm is good. Because the monopolist captures the entire surplus from trade
and has a positive value, there must be positive surplus from trade with a good
rm, and a good rm will obtain a good rating with probability 1 (lemma 6).
Lemma 6 There is positive surplus to provide a good rating to a good rm:
w
 
pG

> cg; an opportunistic agency gives a good rating to a good rm for
sure: y (q) = 1 for all q > 0, and a good rm obtains a rating with probability
1:  (q) = 1.
2.2 Equilibrium Probability of Lying
In this section, I construct and show the uniqueness of equilibrium by deter-
mining an opportunistic agencys equilibrium probability of lying x (q) and
showing that a bad rm obtains a rating for sure.
By lemma 6, a good rm obtains a good rating for sure. A bad rm obtains
a good rating if it approaches the agency, which it does with probability  (q),
and if the agency gives it a good rating, which occurs with probability
1  a (q) = (1  q)x (q) .
Following Mathis et al.(2009), I dene a (q) as the agencys equilibrium accu-
racy. Thus, the investors believe a project with a good rating to be good with
probability
pG =

+ (1  ) (q) (1  a (q)) . (3)
Thus, the value of the agencys good rating, w
 
pG

, which is also its benets
of lying, is strictly increasing in its equilibrium accuracy.
Because a bad rating is only given to a bad rm, after issuing a bad rating,
the agencys reputation becomes
B (q) =
q
a (q)
.
Therefore, the equilibrium probability of lying x (q) must satisfy
x (q) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if w


+(1 )(q)(1 a(q))

 V

q
a(q)

2 [0; 1] if w


+(1 )(q)(1 a(q))

= V

q
a(q)

0 if w


+(1 )(q)(1 a(q))

 V

q
a(q)
 . (4)
We now derive the Bellman equation for the value function. Because a good
rm always obtains a good rating, reputation remains unchanged after a good
rating is issued for a good rm: Gg (q) = q. If an opportunistic agency never
lies, then its reputation never changes, and it receives its rating fee equal to the
value of its good rating, w (1), only when the rm has a good project. Thus, its
equilibrium payo¤ would be
V (q) =  (w (1)) + V (q) .
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Thus, an equilibrium exists in which an opportunistic agency never lies when
reputation is q only if
w (1)  V  B (q) = V (q) = 
1  w (1) . (5)
Proposition 7 If 1   1, then in the unique equilibrium, the agency never
lies, i.e., x (q) = 0 for all q > 0.
Proof. Proposition 7 is a direct application of Proposition 1 in Mathis et
al.(2009) because the fee the agency receives in equilibrium is determined by pG
according to an exogenous function increasing in pG.
On the other hand, when 1  < 1, inequality (5) cannot hold. Thus,
an opportunistic agency lies with positive probability at every reputation level
q 2 [0; 1]. Thus it must weakly prefer lying, and thus its equilibrium payo¤ is
equal to its payo¤ if it always lies for a bad rm:
V (q) = w
 
pG (q)

+ V (q) + (1  ) V (0) .
It follows that
V (q) =
w
 
pG (q)

1   . (6)
Proposition 8 If 1  < 1, then in the unique equilibrium, an opportunistic
agency always lies: x (q) > 0, and V (q) is continuous and strictly increasing
in q, for all q 2 [0; 1].
Proof. If a monopolist does not rate a rm, its reputation does not change.
The opportunistic agency prefers rating a bad rm to not doing so because
w
 
pG (q)

> 1 w
 
pG (q)

= V (q) by (6). By maximum coverage condition,
 (q) = 1 for all q > 0. We have thus pinned down all behaviors except x (q)
to be the same as under Mathis et al.(2009). It follows that the equilibrium
probability of lying, x (q), must be the unique function constructed in Mathis
et al.(2009).
I establish existence by showing that the rating fee given by (2) is optimal for
an honest agency as well. When the rm has a good project, future reputation
remains q whether the agency rates it or not, but the agency receives a positive
rating fee by doing so. When the rm has a bad project, an agency can earn
a higher reputation B (q) > q by giving this rm a bad rating than by not
rating the rm. Because the equilibrium rating fee increases in the agencys
reputation, and thus future payo¤s increase in the future reputation regardless
of agency type, both types of the agency strictly prefer rating a bad rm to not
doing so. The optimality of the rating fee (2) follows immediately
I outline the construction of x (q) here. Dene M1 to be the unique solution
to
w
 

+ (1  )  1  M1 
!
=

1  w (1) = V (1) : (7)
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In the unique equilibrium, x (q) = 1, and thus
V (q) =
w


+(1 )(1 q)

1   ,
for all q  M1 by (3), (6) and because  (q) = 1. For all q < M1 , the agency
must be indi¤erent between lying and not lying in equilibrium, and a (q) is the
solution a to
w


+ (1  ) (1  a)

= V
 q
a

.
The equilibrium accuracy a (q), and thus equilibrium probability of lying x (q),
can thus be solved backward from q  M1 .
3 Duopoly
We now consider competition between two long-lived rating agencies with an
identical discount factor  2 (0; 1). Let q = (q1; q2) denote their reputation
prole at the beginning of a given period. Because we focus on symmetric
equilibria, every equilibrium is associated with a value function V (qi; qj) =
Vi (q), which is the opportunistic agency is equilibrium payo¤ when its own
reputation is qi, and its competitors reputation is qj .
When the two agencies have di¤erent reputation levels, we call the one with
the superior reputation the leading agencyand the one with the inferior repu-
tation the trailing agency.I focus here on equilibria where the leading agency
has a higher value of business, i.e., V (q1; q2) > V (q2; q1), if q1 > q2. I discuss
the implications of this assumption in Section 4. Omitted proofs are in the
Appendix.
The question is whether competition can improve the quality of information.
My focus is thus the case where 1  < 1 because, when

1   1, the monopoly
already achieves the rst best.
3.1 Preliminaries
We rst establish that, as under monopoly, an agency known to be opportunistic
has zero value under duopoly. Thus an agencys future value of business drops
to 0 once it lies. In addition, a rm will not be nanced if it obtains no rating
or a bad rating. I then show that an opportunistic agency lies with positive
probability.
Lemma 9 An agency with zero reputation has zero payo¤: V (0; r) = 0 for all
r 2 [0; 1]. In addition, for all q 2 [0; 1]2, a bad rating or no rating has zero
value: w
 
p; (q)

= w
 
pBi (q)

= 0 for i 2 f1; 2g.
Therefore, as in monopoly case, the only goodan agency sells is its good
rating. A rms willingness-to-pay for agency is good rating is w
 
pGi

. The
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cost for agency i to provide a good rating to a rm with a type v project is
cgi = V
 
Bi
  V  Gig (8)
cbi = V
 
Bi
  V (0; q i) = V  Bi . (9)
Thus, competition does not change the reputation mechanism that trades o¤
the current rating fee with the future value of reputation Bi .
We rst see that, as under monopoly, an opportunistic agency i lies with
positive probability.
Lemma 10 An opportunistic agency i lies with positive probability, xi (q) > 0,
at every reputation prole q 2 [0; 1]2, for i = 1; 2.
Proof. Because the equilibrium is active, i > 0. Suppose to the contrary that
xi = 0, then p
Gi = ii+(1 i)(1 qi)xi = 1 and 
Bi
i =
qi
qi+(1 qi)xi = qi. Because

1  < 1, the maximum payo¤ that agency i can hope for at any reputation
prole is to rate the rm, whatever its type, at a fee equal to the maximum
possible value w (1). Thus, for all q0 2 [0; 1]2,
Vi (q
0)  
1  w (1) < w (1) : (10)
Hence, agency is payo¤ from not rating the bad rm is strictly smaller than
w (1). Because i is providing zero surplus to a bad rm in equilibrium, its
competitor must also provide zero surplus to this rm. Thus, a bad rm will
approach agency i for sure if i charges w (1)   " for a su¢ ciently small " >
0. But then i has a protable deviation by charging w (1)   " to a bad rm,
contradiction.
3.2 Main Result
The main result of this paper compares the market outcomes under duopoly
at reputation prole (q1; q2) where q1  q2, with the market outcome when a
monopolist has reputation q1.
I use two criteria to judge e¢ ciency. Since it is ine¢ cient to invest in a bad
project, the rst criteria is the probability that a bad rm is nanced, that is,P
i2I 

i (q) a

i (q). Since a rms nancial market payo¤ reects the amount of
investment it receives, the second criteria is the value of a good rating that a
good rm receives: w
 
pGi

. I show that adding a competitor with a lower or
equal reputation worsens market e¢ ciency according to both criteria.
Say that agency i is active if it rates a rm with positive probability in the
current period, i.e., if i (q) + i (q) > 0.
Theorem 11 Consider 1  < 1. There exists an equilibrium under duopoly
where the leading agency has a higher value, i.e. V (q1; q2) > V (q2; q1), for all
0  q2 < q1  1. Comparing the market outcome at a reputation prole (q1; q2)
in such an equilibrium under duopoly and the market outcome at reputation level
q1 in the unique equilibrium under monopoly, where 0  q2  q1  1, then either
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1. e¢ ciency is the same, and an active agency lies for sure under both market
structures: xi (q1; q2) = x
 (q1) = 1 for active agency i, or
2. under duopoly, e¢ ciency is worse, and an active agency lies more often:
xi (q1; q2) > x
 (q1).
I will show that if a monopolist rating agency would lie with probability 1,
then it would still lie with probability 1 if it faced competition. If a monopolist
agency randomizes between lying and not lying, the equilibrium probability
of lying is determined by the intersection of the benets-from-lying curve and
the cost-of-lying curve. Competition increases equilibrium probability of lying
because it has no e¤ect the benets-of-lying curve, but lowers the cost-of-lying
curve by lowering future value of business (gure 1).
In proving the theorem, the rst step (lemma 12, Section 3.3) involves show-
ing that if an agency rates a rm of type v with positive probability in equi-
librium, then when a type v rm approaches, the agency either gives it a good
rating with probability 1 or leaves zero surplus. Therefore, if an agency ran-
domizes between giving a good or bad rating to a bad rm, then it must charge
a fee equal to the value of its good rating. Thus, as under monopoly, current
benets from lying for an active agency under duopoly is still equal to the value
of the agencys good rating, which is w
 
pG

= w

i
i+(1 i)(1 qi)xi

, where i
is probability that a rm rated by agency i is good.
The second step (lemma 15, Section 3.4) is to show that when two agencies
have di¤erent reputations at the beginning of a given period, then only the
leading agency is active in that period. Therefore, when the value of the leading
agencys good rating is su¢ ciently high such that it strictly prefers rating a bad
rm, by maximum coverage, a bad rm obtains a rating for sure, and i = .
Thus, competition does not a¤ect the composition of the rms being rated.
The rst two steps imply that the benets-of-lying curve does not change with
competition.
The nal step (lemma 16, Section 3.5) is to show that competition reduces
an agencys value of business, and thus lowers the cost-of-lying curve in gure
1, because competition forces agencies to leave positive surplus for rms with
good projects.
It follows from these three steps that the leading agency lies with higher
probability when faced with competition (gure 1). In Section 3.5, I also show
that equilibrium accuracy and market e¢ ciency are both lower under duopoly.
Lastly, I establish existence by construction in Section 3.6.
3.3 Surplus and Probability of Trade
In this section, I establish the key observation that leads to Theorem 11: com-
petition does not cause an agency to give a positive surplus to a bad rm, as
long as the agency does not lie with probability 1. This observation follows from
the zero surplus lemma saying that agency i will give a good rating to a type v
rm for sure if there is positive surplus from trade between this rm and agency
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i. I then show that, as under monopoly, an agency gives a good rating to a good
rm for sure. It then follows that a duopolists equilibrium probability of lying
is still determined by balancing the future value of reputation from issuing a
bad rating, and the value of its good rating.
Lemma 12 (Zero Surplus) If there is positive surplus from trade between
agency i and a type v rm: w
 
pGi

> cvi , then agency i will give this rm
a good rating for sure: xi = 1 if v = b and y

i = 1 if v = g, for i = 1; 2.
At the fee-setting stage, the two agencies compete for business by giving a
bigger surplus to the rm. Because a rm has a zero payo¤ whether it has no
rating or a bad one, when the rm has a good project, the surplus it gets from
approaching agency i at fee i is
Ugi (q; i) := (qi + (1  qi) y (i; q))
 
w
 
pGi
  i ;
when it has a bad project, the surplus it gets is
U bi (q; i) := (1  qi)x (i; q)
 
w
 
pGi
  i .
I now prove lemma 12. Suppose to the contrary that w
 
pGi

> cvi and
that the opportunistic agency i randomizes strictly between giving a good and
bad rating to a type v rm in equilibrium. Because i randomizes strictly, i
must be charging a type v rm at cost cvi and thus leaves this rm a positive
surplus. Bertrand competition implies that agency  i must be leaving this rm
an equal amount of surplus in equilibrium. Then, by charging 0i = c
v
i + " for
a su¢ ciently small " > 0, agency i can leave a bigger surplus to the type v
rm, because the probability that agency i gives a good rating to a type v rm
jumps upward to 1 but the rms surplus conditional on obtaining a good rating
from i decreases continuously with i. Thus, by raising the rating fee slightly
above cost, agency i will get the business of a type v rm with probability 1,
and earn a higher fee conditional on rating the rm. Because both agencies
leave equal and positive amount of surplus for this rm in equilibrium, agency
i must weakly prefer rating this rm at its equilibrium fee vi = c
v
i to letting
its competitor rate it. Otherwise, if i rates this rm with positive probability,
i has a protable deviation by leaving negative surplus so that this rm will
approach  i for sure; if i does not rate this rm, then charging its equilibrium
fee is weakly dominated by charging w
 
pGi
   for su¢ ciently small . But, if
i weakly prefers rating the rm at the equilibrium fee vi = c
v
i , charging c
v
i +" is
then a protable deviation for i, a contradiction. We have thus proven lemma
12.
By the zero surplus lemma, if agency i does not lie for sure, it must give zero
surplus to a bad rm by charging the rm its willingness-to-pay: vi = w
 
pGi

.
It seems puzzling that the rm, the buyer of a good rating, gains no positive
surplus when there is greater competition. However, the reason the rm receives
zero surplus when the agency is randomizing is that the value of the agencys
good rating is equal to the agencys cost to produce it. Thus, the agency also
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receives zero surplus from selling a good rating to the rm. So, the reason a rm
does not get a positive surplus under competition is that there is zero surplus
from trade to begin with. Hence, no matter which party has the bargaining
power, the surplus for each remains zero. Thus, this result does not depend on
the drastic change in the distribution of bargaining power due to the Bertrand
competition model. We can also model competition as reducing the agencys
share of the surplus from 1 to some  2 (0; 1), and the result will remain
unchanged.
Lemma 12 is very general. It does not depend on the condition that the
leading agency has a higher value than the trailing agency. It goes through even
if there is imperfect monitoring and an agencys reputation never drops to zero.
Using the zero surplus lemma, I can then show that under duopoly, an agency
will give a good rating to a good rm for sure. I do so by rst showing that there
is nonnegative surplus from trade between a bad rm and an agency (lemma
13), and thus there is positive surplus from trade between a good rm and an
agency because cost of a good rating is lower for a good rm.
Lemma 13 w
 
pGi
  cbi for all q 2 (0; 1)2, for i = 1; 2.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that w
 
pGi

< cbi . Then, agency i will not
give a bad rm a good rating at any fee a bad rm is willing to accept. Then
pGi = 1 by Bayesrule if agency i is active, and by rating-consistency if agency
i is inactive. Hence, w
 
pGi

= w (1) > 1 w (1)  Vi (q0) for any reputation
prole q0. We have obtained a contradiction because cbi = Vi
 
Bi

.
Lemma 14 follows by the zero surplus lemma and by noting that it is cheaper
to give a good rating to a good rm than to a bad rm, because V
 
Gig

>
0 = V (0; q i) for all qi > 0 (lemma 9 and active equilibrium).
Lemma 14 An agency gives a good rating to a good rm for sure: yi (q) = 1,
for i = 1; 2, and q 2 (0; 1]2.
Therefore, only a bad rm is given a bad rating. Thus, when a good rating
is given to a good rm, reputation prole is unchanged:
Gig (qi; qj) = (qi; qj) ; (11)
after giving a bad rating, agency is reputation becomes
Bii (q) =
qi
ai (q)
,
where ai (q) := 1  (1  qi)xi is the probability that agency i gives a bad rating
to a bad rm in equilibrium, which is dened as agency is equilibrium accuracy.
Then, the value of agency is good rating is
w
 
pGi

= w

i
i + (1  i) (1  ai )

.
Thus the only way that competition can change the benets-of-lying curve is by
a¤ecting the mix of rms seeking a rating from agency i.
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3.4 Only the Leading Agency is Active
In this section, I show that in an equilibrium where the leading agency has
a higher value, only the leading agency issues a rating. We label the leading
agency as agency 1 without loss of generality.
Lemma 15 (active agency) In an equilibrium where the leading agency has
higher value, 1 (q) = 1 and 

2 (q) = 0 for all 0  q2 < q1  1.
The key battle is over who wins a good rms business. When the rm is
good, future reputation prole remains the same no matter who rates it, but an
agency gets paid only by rating it. Thus, an agency strictly prefers to rate a
good rm and will compete for business by giving a larger surplus to the rm.
Because an opportunistic agency i gives a good rating to a good rm for
sure in equilibrium (lemma 14), its equilibrium fee must be at least equal to
its cost cgi . Thus the maximal surplus that agency i can leave a good rm in
equilibrium is
U
g
i := w
 
pGi
  cgi = w  pGi  V Bii ; q i+ Vi (q) . (12)
If both agencies randomize strictly between lying and not lying in equilib-
rium, then by the zero surplus lemma, w
 
pGi

= Vi
 
Bi

for i = 1; 2. By
(12) and the condition that the leading agency has higher value, the leading
agency is able to leave a bigger surplus for a good rm and thus will win all of
its business. Thus, the trailing agency must be inactive, otherwise 2 (q) = 0,
contradicting the active condition. In Appendix A.3, I discuss the other cases.
3.5 Value of Reputation
This section shows that competition decreases the value of reputation for both
the leading and trailing agency. Here V (:; :) refers to the value function under
duopoly and V (:) refers to the value function under monopoly.
Lemma 16 In an equilibrium in which the leading agency has a higher value,
V (q1; q2)  V (q1) for all (q1; q2) 2 [0; 1]2, and strict inequality holds for all
(q1; q2) 2 (0; 1)2.
It su¢ ces to discuss the case in which q1 > q2 because when the two agencies
have equal reputations, by symmetry, each agency plays the role of a leading
agency and trailing agency with probability 12 .
We rst consider the case in which the leading agency is believed to be
honest. The proof does not rely on the condition that the leading agency has
higher value.
Lemma 17 V (1; r) = V (1) and V (r; 1) = 0 for all r 2 [0; 1). In addition, a
good rm approaches the agency with a perfect reputation with probability 1.
17
Proof. Because agency 1 is believed to be honest, it can leave a surplus up to
w (1) to a good rm.
I rst argue that 2 < 1. Suppose to the contrary, then w
 
pG1

= w
 
pG2

=
w (1), then Bertrand competition will drive a good rms fee down to zero. But
then V (r; 1) = 0 because a good rm pays zero rating fee, but a bad rm never
approaches agency 2, and reputation prole never change. In addition, when the
rm is bad, agency 2 can get its business by charging a fee slightly below w (1),
because the bad rm expects zero surplus from agency 1, and an opportunistic
agency 2 will give a good rating at such a fee given that w (1) > V (q0) for
any q0. Agency 2 strictly prefers doing so to not rating the rm and obtaining
V (r; 1) = 0 in the future, a contradiction to 2 = 0.
Hence, 2 < 1, and thus w
 
pG2

< w (1) because x2 > 0 by lemma 10. Thus
a good rm never approaches agency 2 in equilibrium. But then neither does
a bad rm, otherwise 2 = 0. So, agency 2 is inactive, and thus V (r; 1) = 0
because agency 1 never loses its reputation.
We then see that there must be zero surplus from trade between agency 2
and a bad rm, i.e. w
 
pG2

= V2
 
B2

, otherwise a bad rm will obtain a
rating from agency 2 for sure, but then 2 = 0. Thus, by (12), agency 2 can
leave only a zero surplus to a good rm. Hence, g1 = w (1). An opportunistic
agency 1 will then obtain V (1; r) = w(1)1  = V (1).
Because the trailing agency is inactive until the leading agency lies and
loses all of its reputation, it derives value from becoming a monopolist at the
current reputation level at a future date. Thus, its value is lower than being a
monopolist today. But, as long as 0 < q2 < q1 < 1, the trailing agency becomes
a monopolist with positive probability, and thus derive positive value.
Although trailing agency 2 is inactive, by lemma 13 and (12), agency 2 can
leave a good rm a surplus equal to at least V2 (q). To compete for business,
g1  w
 
pG1
  V2 (q) < w  pG1 (13)
for all 0 < q2 < q1 < 1. This discount to a good rm reduces value for the
leading agency.
Claim 18 When q1  M1 and q2 < q1, then x1 (q) = 1 and 1 (q) = 1, and thus
w
 
pG1 (q)

= w
 
pG (q1)

, but V (q1; q2)  V (q1), and strict inequality holds if
q1 < 1.
Proof. Agency 1 must lie for sure in equilibrium, otherwise,
w
 
pG1

= w


+ (1  )1 (q) (1  q1)x1

> w
 

+ (1  )  1  M1 
!
= V (1)  V1
 
B1

by (7) and because w (:) is strictly increasing. Thus, x1 = 1 by the zero surplus
lemma. Because the surplus from a good rating between agency 1 and a bad rm
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is positive, in equilibrium, a bad rm must approach agency 1 with probability 1.
Thus, the value of agency 1s good rating is w
 
pG1

= w


+(1 )(1 q1)

, which
is the same as when agency 1 is a monopolist. It is then immediate from (13)
that the leading agencys value of business goes down as long as 0 < q2 < q1 < 1.
However, the value of business for q1  M1 is exactly the cost of lying when
the leading agencys reputation is somewhat below M1 , which implies that for
q1 < 
M
1 , the cost-of-lying curve shifts down. The following claim completes the
proof for both lemma 16 and Theorem 11.
Claim 19 w
 
pG1 (q)

< w
 
pG (q1)

and V (q1; q2)  V (q1) for all 0  q2 <
q1 < 
M
1 ,
We rst observe that w
 
pG1

= V1
 
B1

, otherwise w
 
pG1

> V1
 
B1

by lemma 13, but then x1 = 1 and V1
 
B1

= V (1) > w


+(1 )(1 q1)

because q1 < M1 , which is a contradiction. Thus, agency 1 must charge a bad
rm its willingness-to-pay.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists 0 < q2 < q1 such that V (q1; q2) 
V (q1). We can then (see Appendix A.4 for details) show that there exists q^ =
(q^1; q^2) and q1 2

q^1;
q^1
M1

such that V (q^1; q^2)  V (q^1), but V (q1; q2) < V (q1)
for all q2 < q1 and q1 > q1 and for all q1 = q^1 and q2  B22 (q^).
If a bad rm obtains a rating for sure, then the benets of lying as a function
of equilibrium accuracy a1 are the same as under monopoly. But the cost of lying
as a function of a1 is V

q^1
a1
; q^2

< V

q^1
a1

for all a1  M1 by construction
of q1. Because for all a1 > 
M
1 , w


+(1 )(1 a1)

> V (1)  V

q^1
a1
; q^2

, the
solution a1 to
w


+ (1  ) (1  a1)

= V

q^1
a1
; q^2

must be lower than the equilibrium accuracy a (q1) under monopoly, and as
a result, the value of a good rating at (q^1; q^2) must be lower than w
 
pG (q^1)

.
Then,
V (q^1; q^2) =
g1 (q^) + (1  )b1 (q^)
1  
<
w
 
pG1 (q^)

1  
<
w
 
pG (q^1)

1   = V (q^1) .
If a bad rm randomizes between obtaining a rating and no rating, by maxi-
mum coverage condition, the leading agency must weakly prefer that the trailing
agency rates a bad rm. Therefore, the value of the leading agencys good rating
is no more than the value that agency 1 derives from waiting and maintaining
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the same reputation, hoping that the trailing agency will lie so that it becomes
a monopolist at the same reputation level in the future; that is,
w
 
pG1
  (1  a2 (q^))V (q^1) + a2 (q^)V q^1; B22 (q^)
< V (q^1)
because a2 (q^) > 0 by 10 and the construction of q^2. Thus, the value of agency
1s good rating under duopoly is lower than that when it is a monopolist because

1  < 1.
3.6 Construction of Equilibrium
I show the existence of equilibria by construction. I rst construct the leading
agencys probability of lying function assuming that a bad rm obtains a rating
for sure at all reputation proles. We can then check, whether at some rep-
utation proles, this assumption contradicts the requirement that the leading
agency has a higher value than the trailing agency. If so, then we need to mod-
ify the probability a bad rm obtains a rating. The value function associated
with the equilibrium so constructed is continuous except possibly when the two
agencies have an equal reputation. In addition, the value for the leading agency
is strictly increasing in its own reputation, whereas that for the trailing agency
is strictly decreasing in the leading agencys reputation. I construct behaviors
o¤ the equilibrium path and verify all equilibrium conditions in Appendix A.5.3
and A.5.4.
By symmetry, an equilibrium can be described by the strategy prole

g; b; ; ; x; y

together with the belief system
g; b; ; pG; pB ; p;; B ; Gg; Gb

which is a function of q = (qi; q i) where the rst argument is the agencys own
reputation and the second argument is its competitors reputation. For example,
pG (qi; qj) is the probability a rm with agency is good rating is believed to be
good, when agency is reputation is qi and agency js reputation is qj . In the
following, q1 is taken to be the leading agencys reputation, and q2 the trailing
agencys reputation.
3.6.1 Preliminaries
I summarize the behaviors already pinned down by equilibrium.
By the active agency lemma 15 and by symmetry, at the equilibrium fee
prole, a good rm obtains a rating for sure from the leading agency, and
randomizes equally between the two when they have equal reputation. A bad
rm does not approach the trailing agency:  (qi; qj) = 0 if qi < qj . By lemma
14, y (qi; qj) = 1.
Given equilibrium behaviors (x; ), agency is accuracy is
a (qi; qj) = 1  (1  qi)x (qi; qj) . (14)
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Then
pG (q1; q2) =

+ (1  ) (q1; q2) (1  a (q1; q2))
and
pG (q2; q1) =
 (q2; q1)
 (q2; q1) + (1   (q2; q1)) (1  a (q2; q1)) .
The reputation prole after i gives a good rating is Gg (qi; qj) = (qi; qj),
whereas that after it gives a bad rating is
B (qi; qj) =

qi
a (qi; qj)
; qj

for i = 1; 2.
We now derive the Bellman equation for the agenciesvalue functions. The
reputation prole does not change if no rating is issued or a good rm is rated.
If the leading agency lies for a bad rm, agency 2 becomes a monopolist at its
current reputation q2. Hence,
V (q2; q1) =
(1  ) (q1; q2) 
1     (1  )  (1   (q1; q2))


(1  a (q1; q2))V (q2) + a (q1; q2)V

q2;
q1
a (q1; q2)

.(15)
In equilibrium, the leading agency always weakly prefers to lie. Thus, its equi-
librium payo¤ is equal to its payo¤ when it gives a good rating to both types of
rm for sure:
V (q1; q2) =
(+ (1  ) (q1; q2))w
 
pG (q1; q2)
  V (q2; q1)
1     (1  )  (1   (q1; q2)) . (16)
I will construct an equilibrium in which a good rating has no positive sur-
plus between a bad rm and a trailing agency; that is, V
 
B (q2; q1)

=
w
 
pG (q2; q1)

for all q2 < q1. Thus the equilibrium fees agency i charges are
g (qi; q i) = w
 
pG (qi; q i)
  V (q2; q1) (17)
and
b (qi; q i) = w
 
pG (qi; q i)

(18)
for i = 1; 2.
3.6.2 Behavior On the Equilibrium Path
Only agency 1 gives a rating on the equilibrium path by the active agency
lemma. We rst construct the probability the leading agency is chosen by a bad
rm and the probability the leading agency lies. I derive the properties for the
value function associated with these behaviors on path.
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By claim 18, x (q1; q2) = 1 =  (q1; q2) for all q1 > q2 and q1  M1 . Given
the rating fees (17) and (18),
V (q2; q1) =
(1  ) 
1   (1  q1)V (q2) (19)
V (q1; q2) =
w


+(1 )(1 q1)

  V (q2; q1)
1   . (20)
Thus, V (:; :) is continuous, strictly increasing in the agencys own reputation
and strictly decreasing in its competitors reputation.
For q1 < M1 , a good rating has zero surplus between the leading agency
and a bad rm. I rst assume that a bad rm obtains a rating for sure from
agency 1 and construct what the leading agencys probability of lying must be
in equilibrium under this assumption. Denote by ~x (q1; q2) the leading agencys
probability of lying under this construction and the value function associated
with both agencies by

~V (q1; q2) ; ~V (q2; q1)

. For xed q2, this construction is
similar to that in Mathis et al.(2009).
Claim 20 The value function ~V (:; :) thus constructed is continuously increasing
in an agencys own reputation and continuously decreasing in its competitors
reputation for all (q1; q2) 2 [0; 1]2.
Proof. Dene D1 (q2) = 
M
1 , for all q2. Dene ~x
 (q1; q2) = 1 and ~V (:; :) on
(q1; q2) : q1  M1
	
by (19) and (20). Then claim 20 holds on

(q1; q2) : q1  M1
	
.
Suppose Dk (q2) is dened for all q2, 
D
k (q)  M1  Dk 1 (q), and ~V (:; :) is
well-dened such that claim 20 holds on

(q1; q2) : q1 2

Dk (q2) ; 1
	
. Dene
Dk+1 (q2) such that
w
0B@ 
+ (1  )

1  
D
k+1
Dk (q2)

1CA =  ~V  Dk ; q2 (21)
if Dk (q2) > q2 and the solution is no smaller than q2, and dene it as q2
otherwise. Because the left hand side of (21) is continuously decreasing in Dk+1,
and is greater than V (1)   ~V  Dk ; q2 when Dk+1 = M1  Dk and smaller
than V
 
Dk ; q2

when Dk+1 = 0, there exists a unique solution 
D
k+1 (q2) 
M1  Dk (q2).
Dene ~a
 
Dk+1 (q2) ; q2

=
Dk (q2)
Dk+1(q2)
. For q1 2
 
Dk+1; 
D
k

, dene the lead-
ing agencys probability of lying by (14), where the accuracy ~a (q1; q2) is the
solution a to
w


+ (1  ) (1  a)

=  ~V
 q1
a
; q2

. (22)
Claim 21 ~a (q1; q2) and B1 (q1; q2) =
q1
~a(q1;q2)
> Dk (q2) are both well-dened,
continuously increasing in q1, and continuously decreasing in q2.
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Proof. See Appendix A.5.1.
Because the leading agencys reputation level rises to above Dk after giv-
ing a bad rating, by hypothesis, the property of ~a (:; :), and the fact that
V (q2; q1)  V (q2) for all q2 < q1 and strict inequality holds for q2 > 0,
claim 20 holds for ~V (q2; q1) on

(q1; q2) : q1 2 [Dk+1 (q2) ; Dk (q2))
	
. Because the
value of agency 1s good rating is determined by (22), plugging  (q1; q2) = 1
into (16), we can immediately see that claim 20 also holds for ~V (q1; q2) on
(q1; q2) : q1 2 [Dk+1 (q2) ; Dk (q2))
	
. Because either Dk+1 (q2)  M1  Dk (q2)
or Dj (q2) = q2 for every j  k + 1, there exists nite K 2 N such that
q1 2 [DK+1 (q2) ; DK (q2)] for all q1 > q2. Claim 20 then follows by induction.
Dene
I =
n
q2 : 9q1 > q2 such that ~V (q1; q2)  ~V (q2; q1)
o
,
which is the set of trailing agency reputation levels such that the foregoing
construction does not work for some reputation proles. For all r 2 I, dene
 (r) as the unique solution   sup
n
q1 : ~V (q1; q2)  ~V (q2; q1)
o
to
 ~V


~a (; r)
; r

=

1  (1  )

1  1 a(;r)1 a(;r) r




1  (1  )

1  1 a(;r)1 a(;r) r

 (1  ) 
1     (1  )

1  1 a(;r)1 a(;r) r



"
(1  a (; r))V (r) +
(1  a (; r)) a (; r) r
1  a (; r) r
~V

r;

a (; r)
#
.(23)
It is well-dened and continuous for all r 2 I (claim 37).
Dene
A = f(q1; q2) : q2 2 I, q1 2 (q2;  (q2))g
C =
n
(q1; q2) : (q1; q2) 2 [0; 1]2 , q1 > q2
o
.
For (q1; q2) 2 CnA, let the behaviors be described by the previous construc-
tion, i.e.,  (q1; q2) = 1 and a (q1; q2) = ~a (q1; q2). Then, for q 2 CnA, the
values for the leading and trailing agencies are still given by ~V (:; :) because the
leading agencys probability of lying and the future value for both agencies both
depend only on the agenciesvalues at B (q1; q2) 2 CnA. This further implies
that the leading agency is indi¤erent between lying and not lying because of
(22). Moreover, V (q1; q2) > V (q2; q1) for all (q1; q2) 2 CnA by construction of
 and claim 20.
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For (q1; q2) 2 A, let  (q1; q2) = 1 ~a
((q2);q2)
1 ~a((q2);q2) q1(q2)
and a (q1; q2) = 1  
1 ~a((q2);q2)
(q1;q2)
. Then, x (q1; q2) is well-dened by equation (14) because a (q1; q2)
so dened is in [q1; a ( (q2) ; q2)]. Because
q1
a(q1;q2)
=  (q2), the future reputa-
tion proles that will be realized if the players follow this strategy prole are
in CnA, and thus the values already dened. Thus the equilibrium payo¤ at
(q1; q2) is well-dened by (15) and (16). Given the equilibrium probability of ly-
ing x (q1; q2), by the construction of  and a, agency 1 is indi¤erent between
lying and not lying.
Lastly, when the two agencies have equal reputation level r 2 (0; 1), dene
 (r; r) = 12 limq1!r+ 
 (q1; r) and x (r; r) = limq1!r+ x
 (q1; r). In Appendix
A.5.1, I show that an agency approached by a bad rm is indi¤erent between
lying and not lying in equilibrium.
3.6.3 Properties of the Value Function
We will now see that the payo¤ associated with the constructed equilibrium is
continuous on C and on the section of the diagonal line f(r; r) : r 2 Ig, and an
increase in the leading agencys reputation increases the payo¤ for the leading
agency, but decreases that for the trailing agency. In addition, the leading
agency always has a higher payo¤ than the trailing agency. Omitted proofs are
in the Appendix.
We rst observe that the behaviors on the equilibrium path after the equi-
librium fee prole is proposed are all continuous on C. This follows immediately
from the continuity of ~a (:; :) and ~V (:; :) and the construction.
Observation a (q1; q2), x (q1; q2),  (q1; q2), V (q1; q2) and V (q2; q1) are all
continuous on C.
In addition, the better the leading agencys reputation is, the higher its own
payo¤ is, and the lower the trailing agencys payo¤ is.
Lemma 22 @V@q1 (q1; q2) > 0, but
@V
@q2
(q1; q2) < 0 on C.
By the construction of  (r) for all r 2 I, when a bad rm obtains no rating
with positive probability in equilibrium, the values for the leading agency and
trailing agency converge as the formers reputation approaches that of latter,
that is, limq1!r+ V (q1; r) = limq1!r+ V (r; q1). Lemma 23 then follows immedi-
ately by the continuity of the value function V (:; :) on C. This further implies
that an agencys value function is continuous at q = (r; r) for r 2 I.
Lemma 23 For r 2 I, limq1!r+ V (q1; r) = limq2!r  V (q2; r) = V (r; r).
Using lemma 23 and lemma 22, we can see that the leading agency always
has a higher payo¤ than the trailing agency.
Lemma 24 V (q1; q2) > V (q2; q1) for all q1 > q2.
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Proof.
V (q1; q2)  V (q2; q1)
= V (q1; q2)  lim
r!q+2
V (r; q2) 
 
V (q2; q1)  lim
r!q+2
V (q2; r)
!
> 0
because V (r; q2) is increasing in r and V (q2; r) is decreasing in r.
4 Discussion of assumptions
Fees Are Not Paid if Securities Are Not Issued This assumption is made
by both Mathis et al.(2009) and Bolton et al.(forthcoming), and is supposed
to capture the conict of interest in the issuer-pays model and the pressure
on rating agencies to issue a good rating. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission found that rating agencies often allow key participants in the
rating process to participate in fee discussions.The rating fee that a bad rating
forfeits can also be thought of as including future rating business or consulting
services. In an article about a reform in the rating fee structure, Reuters cites
New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo as saying that under the old fee
system, the agencies had a nancial incentive to assign high ratings because they
only received fees if a deal was completed.3 Levin and Coburn (2010) document
a considerable body of email correspondence within Moodys and S&P about
the threat of losing deals by not giving an investment bank the desired rating
on its securities or by using tougher standards.
A Rating Agency Sets Its Own Rating Fee. This assumption is also
made by Bolton et al.(forthcoming). They cited Whites (2002) comment that
agencies may negotiate fees with regular customers. In S&Ps ratings schedule
for 2009, the fees for structured nance range up to 12 basis points, and
higher fees applied to more complex transactions.It also states that fees can
be negotiated for volume issuers and other entities who want multi-year ratings
services agreements.Levin and Coburn (2011) document email correspondence
about one deal linking a rating with an unusually hefty fee. They also cite a
Moodys email from 2007 raising concern over its market share in CDOs and
asking if Fitch is cheaper. This fee can also be thought of simply as a way
for the agency to choose how much surplus to give to the rm it rates. It can
capture the speed of work or the amount of resources and cooperation requested
of the issuer. Levin and Coburn (2011) provide incidences suggesting a shift in
the relationship between Moodys and the issuers  from the agency being
considered a necessary evil to it having to exert great e¤ort just to please the
issuers.
3<http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN0528456020080606>
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Agencies Observe The quality of the Product Before Deciding on
Its Rating Fee. It is a simplifying assumption reecting the fact that an
agency has a lot of information about the product at the time rating fees are
negotiated. According to a statement by Stephen W. Joynt, the CEO of Fitch,
an objective opinion about the creditworthiness of an issuer can be formed
based solely on public information in many jurisdictions.4 In addition, a rating
agency often follows an important rm even if it is not selected to rate its
issuances. Therefore, a rating agency knows a good deal about a product before
it makes an o¤er. Moreover, Joynt admits that structured nance analysts
may be involved in fee discussions,5 and analysts may learn even more about
the product during negotiation. SEC (2008) and Levin and Coburn (2011) both
document the presence of analysts when fees are negotiated. Levin and Coburn
(2011) cited an email correspondence from Moodys to Merril lynch about an
unusually high fee that Moodys is proposing for a deal : ...the rating process
so far has already shown that the analysis for this deal is far more involved and
will continue to be so. We have spent signicant amount of resource[s] on this
deal and it will be di¢ cult for us to continue with this process if we do not have
an agreement on the fee issue.It suggests that by the time fees are negotiated,
the agency already has a lot of information about the product.
A Seller Obtains One or No Rating According to Joynt (2002), in struc-
tured nance, Fitch is frequently one of two rating agencies rating a security
chosen by the issuer from among the three agencies. The market behavior
seemed to change dramatically after Fitch became an important third player.6
For example, Levin and Coburn (2011) cite a 2006 email in which UBS threat-
ened to do moodytch only cdosif S&P decided to use a more conservative
rating model.The signicant e¤ect of increasing the number of rating agencies
from two to three may be driven by regulatory requirements that some products
obtain at least two ratings. As a simplied model to capture the e¤ect when
issuers have one more degree of freedom in their choice of raters, I assume that
a seller obtains at most one rating and compare equilibria when the number of
agencies increases from one to two.
Agency with Higher Reputation Has Higher Value The crucial obser-
vation in this paper, the zero surplus lemma, does not depend on whether one
agencys value is higher than or equal to the others. Theorem 11 still holds
if, instead of the value inequality condition, the market beliefs about the two
agencies are disciplined via the beliefs about the average quality of the rms
they rate.
4The full quote Although structured nance analysts may be involved in fee
discussions, they are typically senior analysts who understand the need to man-
age the potential conict of interest. It is in an email from Fitch to SEC. See
<http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/tchratings1.htm>
5See Note 4.
6See Becker et al. (2011).
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Two weaker assumptions provide similar results. The rst alternative is
to strengthen the maximum coverage condition by requiring the following. If
agency i strictly prefers rating a bad rm at its equilibrium fee to letting its
competitor or no agency rate this rm, then investorsbeliefs about the aver-
age quality of rms rated by agency i cannot be better than the prior , i.e.,
 (qi; qj)  .
The second alternative is to require that investors believe the average quality
of rms rated by a more reputable agency to be at least as high as the average
quality of rms rated by less reputable agency, i.e.,  (q1; q2)   (q2; q1) if
q1  q2.
All proofs pretty much go through except that an active agency is not nec-
essarily the leading agency.
Without any of these conditions to discipline investorsbeliefs, an equilib-
rium under duopoly may exhibit a good rating with higher value than that under
monopoly at one reputation prole, at the expense of having a good rating with
a much lower value than that under monopoly at a higher reputation prole.
In such an equilibrium, it is necessary that when the leading agency has very
good reputation, both agencies are active, and the investors believe that the
average quality of rms rated by the trailing agency is much better than the
prior and much better than that of rms rated by the leading agency. There-
fore, an agency can earn a more favorable market belief about the rms it rates
by improving the reputation of its competitor so that it lags more signicantly
behind its competitor in reputation terms. Hence, an agency may maintain a
higher value under duopoly than under monopoly at some reputation proles by
waiting for its competitor to gain a better reputation. Whether such an equi-
librium exists depends considerably on the parameters and functional forms.
In addition, it requires counterintuitive beliefs to redistribute value across
reputation proles.
5 Conclusion
In both the issuer-pays model used in the credit rating industry and the com-
mission model for a sales intermediary, the agency or information intermediary
has a short-run incentive to lie about the true quality of the product it rates
because of the conict of interest inherent in the pay structure. The agency
gets paid a fee in the current period only if it gives a good rating. It is only the
agencys concern for the future value of reputation that may stop it from lying.
This paper builds on Mathis et al.(2009) and employs a fully dynamic model
that endogenizes the value of reputation to examine the e¤ect of competition on
the reputation mechanism. To focus on the business stealing e¤ect, I abstract
away many other aspects related to having more information intermediaries, for
example, the phenomenon of ratings shopping, the market coverage, or the im-
proved information from having two imperfect signals about quality assuming
that the agencies are truthful.
I nd that whenever a monopolist might sometimes lie, adding a competitor
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of equal or poorer reputation can only increase the probability that the agency
lies, thereby increasing the probability that a bad rm is invested in, and low-
ering the value of a good rating issued in this market. It suggests that the rise
of Fitch may have caused S&P and Moodys to become more lax by presenting
the issuers with a degree of freedom in obtaining two ratings. This is the case
because, in general, competition does not reduce the benets of lying because
it does not cause the agency to lower the rating fee for a bad rm. However,
competition does lower the agencys cost of lying by forcing it to leave more
surplus to a good rm, thereby lowering the value of business at higher repu-
tation levels. It follows that competition causes an agency to lie more often in
equilibrium. In other words, because good rms represent better deals and a
higher surplus from trade, competition slashes the fee received from a good rm
much more than the fee from a bad rm. But the reputation mechanism kicks
in exactly when an agency is faced with a bad rm. Therefore, competition
increases the incentives to lie.
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A Appendix For Online Publication
A.1 Monopoly Section
A.1.1 Zero Value to Zero Reputation
Lemma 25 V (0) = 0.
Proof. We show that w
 
pG

= 0. Because reputation does not change once the
agency is known to be opportunistic, there are zero costs for the agency to give a
good rating to any rm. Suppose w
 
pG

> 0. Then in equilibrium, the agency
charges v = w
 
pG

to both v = b; g and both types must obtain a rating with
probability 1. In addition, the agency gives a good rating with probability 1
regardless of rm type. But then pG =  and w
 
pG

= 0, a contradiction. But
then V (0) = 0 + V (0), so V (0) = 0.
A.1.2 A Bad Rating Has Zero Value
I next show that, under both market structures, a bad rating from agency i has
zero value if this agency loses all future business when it becomes known to be
opportunistic. It follows from lemma 25 that w
 
pB

= 0 under monopoly.
Lemma 26 In any active equilibrium, w
 
pBi

= 0 if V (0; q i) = 0.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that w
 
pBi

> 0. Then securities will be
issued and the project quality will be found out after agency i gives a good
rating. When the rm is good, agency i loses its reputation by giving a bad
rating, but if it gives a good rating, its reputation will remain positive. Because
having positive reputation has nonzero value, the cost of good rating for a good
rm is negative:
cgi = V
 
Big
  V  Gig
= V (0; q i)  V

Gigi ; q i

=  V

Gigi ; q i

< 0.
Suppose investment takes place if i publishes a good rating. Then agency i is
paid the fee he sets regardless of the rating he publishes. Thus it is optimal
for i to publish a good rating for a good project because this gives rise to
positive future reputation, and thus positive future value, while publishing a
bad rating will make i lose all reputation, which has zero value given that the
opponent has zero reputation too. Contradiction. If investment does not take
place after agency i publishes a good rating, then agency i is paid if and only if
a bad rating is published. Then when the rm is bad, publishing a bad rating
gives i higher future reputation than publishing a good rating. Thus i strictly
prefers publishing a bad rating when the rm is bad. Because pBi > , the
probability that a rm that approaches agency i is good must be positive. Thus
pGi = 1, and thus securities are issued if the rm obtains a good rating from i.
Contradiction.
A.1.3 A Good Rating Has Positive Value
Lemma 27 w
 
pG (q)

> 0 for all q > 0.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that securities are never issued. The agencys
future reputation thus remains q, and its payo¤ is
V (q) = 0 + V (q) .
Thus V (q) = 0, contradicting the condition that V (q) > 0.
A.1.4 Zero Outside Option
We obtain that w
 
p;

= 0 under both market structures from the following
lemma and the maximal coverage condition that w
 
p;

= 0 if ; is o¤ the
equilibrium path.
Lemma 28 In an active equilibrium under either monopoly or duopoly, either
a good rm obtains a rating with probability 1, or ; is o¤ equilibrium path.
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Proof. We rst show that a good rm must approach an agency with positive
probability. If a good rm never approaches any agency, then either no rm
approaches any agency, and thus the agencies reputation will not change, or
only a bad rm may approach an agency, and thus ratings are of no value
because only bad rms obtain any ratings, therefore agencies always give a bad
rating to a bad rm and hence reputations do not change in equilibrium. In
both cases, agency i obtains no positive fee in the current period and maintain
the same reputation and thus same value, i.e.
Vi (q) = 0 + Vi (q) .
Thus Vi (q) = 0, contradiction to the assumption of an active equilibrium. Thus
we can assume w.l.o.g. that agency 1 is approached by a good rm with positive
probability.
Then w
 
pG1

> w
 
p;

. Otherwise, a bad rm will never approach agency 1
because it obtains a bad rating from agency 1 with probability at least q1 > 0,
and thus even if agency 1 charges zero fee, a bad rm still gets a higher payo¤
from not obtaining a rating from agency 1. But then pG1 = 1 > p;, contradiction
to the hypothesis that w
 
pG1
  w  p; because w is strictly increasing for
p  .
Assume to the contrary that w
 
p;

> 0. Because an honest agency always
gives a good rating to a good project, and both types of agencies charge the
same price, G1g1  q1 = ;1. Suppose a good rm approaches agency 1 and
approaches no agency both with positive probability. Then g1 = w
 
pG1
  
w(p;)
q+(1 q)y so that a good rm is indi¤erent between agency 1 and obtaining no
rating. Then a bad rm must also randomize between obtaining no rating and
approaching some agency i. Otherwise, either p; = 1, a contradiction, or p;  ,
contradicting the hypothesis that w
 
p;

> 0. If a bad rm never approaches
agency 1 in equilibrium, then the probability that a rm getting no rating or
a rating from agency 2 has a good project is less than . Thus either p; < ,
a contradiction, or pG2 < , in which case w
 
pG2

= 0 and thus approaching
agency 2 is strictly dominated by obtaining no rating, a contradiction. So a
bad rm must also put positive probability on obtaining no rating and also
approaching agency 1. For a bad rm to be indi¤erent between obtaining no
rating and approaching agency 1,
b1 = w
 
pG1
  w  p;
(1  q)x1
.
Thus agency 1 must give a good rating to a bad rm with positive probability
in equilibrium. Thus
b1  V1
 
B1
  V1  G1b
= V1
 
B1

.
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I will show that G1g1 = q1. Suppose otherwise, then it must be the case that
y1 2 (0; 1). Thus
w
 
pG1
  w  p;
q + (1  q) y1
= g1
= V1
 
B1
  V1  G1g
< V1
 
B1

 w  pG1  w  p;
(1  q)x1
.
Thus q+(1  q) y1 < (1  q)x1. Let 1 denote the probability that a rm rated
by agency 1 is good. Then
pG1 =
1 (q + (1  q) y1)
1 (q + (1  q) y1) + (1  1) (1  q)x
=
1
1 + (1  1) (1 q)xq+(1 q)y1
<
1
1 + (1  1) 1 (1 q)x

1
(1 (q+(1 q)y1))
= pB1 .
But w
 
pB1

= 0. Thus w
 
pG1

= 0, contradiction. Likewise, if a good rm
approaches agency 2 (under the duopoly model) with positive probability, then
the same argument shows that G2g2 = q2 and y

2 = 1. Thus, whether or not
the good rm approaches agency 1, the reputation prole does not change,
and hence agency 1s future payo¤s are the same. But agency 1 obtains g1 =
w
 
pG1
   w  p; > 0 if the good rm approaches agency 1. Then as long as
w
 
pG1
   w  p; > V1  B1   V1  G1g, after charging g1   " for " > 0
su¢ ciently small, agency 1 will still give a good rating to the good rm and
thus the good rm will strictly prefer approaching agency 1 and will choose
agency 1 with probability 1. Therefore, agency 1 can increase its payo¤ by
charging g1   ", a contradiction to g1 being his equilibrium fee. Thus it must
be the case that w
 
pG1
   w  p; = V1  B1   V1  G1g, so by charging a
lower rating fee, agency 1 will subsequently issue a bad rating for sure and thus
lose all business from the good rm. But then
w
 
pG1
  w  p;
(1  q1)x1
< w
 
pG1
  w p; < V1  B1 .
We have shown that in equilibrium, a bad rm must approach agency 1 with
positive probability, thus b1  w
 
pG1
   w(p;)(1 q1)x1 , so that a bad rm weakly
prefers approaching agency 1 to obtaining no rating. But then the fee is lower
than agency 1s reputation cost. Thus x1 = 0. But then a bad rm strictly
prefers obtaining no rating to approaching agency 1, a contradiction.
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A.1.5 Proof for Lemma 6
The complication of the proof comes from not requiring the value function to
be increasing in reputation.
Proof for Lemma 6. Suppose to the contrary that w
 
pG

= cg. Then,
w
 
pG

< cb, and thus the opportunistic monopolist gives a bad rm a bad
rating for sure at any fee that a rational bad rm may accept. It follows that
pG = 1 and
B =
(1  ) q
(1  ) q + ((1  ) (1  q) +  (1  q) (1  y))
 q
<
q
q + (1  q) y
= Gg.
Thus, w (1) = V
 
B
   V  Gg. It is a contradiction if V (:) is weakly
increasing.
However, we can see the contradiction even without requiring the equilibrium
value function increasing.
Because V (q0)  max
n
w(1)
1  ;
w(1)
1 
o
for all q0 2 [0; 1], it follows that

1  > 1. Because w
 
pG (q)

= cg,
V (q) = 
 
w (1) + V
 
Gg

+ (1  ) V  B
= V
 
B

+ V
 
Gg

 w (1) + V  Gg .
Because V
 
Gg

> 0, V (q) < V
 
B

. If V (q)  V  Gg, then V (q) 
V (B)
1  > V
 
B

because 1  > 1, contradicting the fact that V
 
Gg

<
V
 
B

. So V (q) > V
 
Gg

and Gg > q.
Because V (q) < V
 
B
  1 w (1), which is the payo¤ if the agency is
believed never to lie at any reputation level on the equilibrium path, it must
be the case that there exists q0 2 (0; 1) such that agency the lies with positive
probability. Because cg < cb, if x (q0) > 0, then y (q0) = 1, and thus Gg (q0) =
q0 and B (q0) > q0. If x (q0) = 1, then w
 
pG

< w (1) < V (1) = V
 
B

,
contradicting the hypothesis that x (q0) > 0. Thus, x (q0) 2 (0; 1), and it
follows that V (q0) =
V (B(q0))
1  . Then, V (q
0) > V
 
B (q0)

. Dene q0 = q0,
and q1 = B (q0). Then, we have q1 > q0 and
V (qk+1) =


1  
 1
V (qk) < V (qk) (24)
for k = 0.
Suppose the agency does not lie at q1. If x (q1) = 0 and y (q1) = 1, then
B (q1) = q1. It follows that V (q1) =
w(1)
1   V (q0), a contradiction of (24).
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If y < 1, then Gg (q1) > q0, and V
 
Gg (q1)

< V (q1) =


1 
 1
V (q0).
Dene q2 = Gg (q1). Because V
 
B (q1)

> V (q1),
V (qk)  w (1) + V (qk+1) + (1  ) V (qk) (25)
V (qk) > V (qk+1) (26)
for k = 1.
Suppose the agency lies with positive probability at q1. Then using previ-
ous arguments, there exists q2 > q1 such that V (q2) =


1 
 1
V (q1). By
induction, there exists a strictly increasing sequence fqkg1k=0 such that either
(24) holds or (25) and (26) hold for each k. Because fqkgk is strictly increasing
and fV (qk)gk is strictly decreasing, these limits exist. If (25) and (26) hold for
innitely many k, then
lim
k!1
V (qk)  w (1)
1   .
But, then V (qk) >
w(1)
1  because V (qk) is strictly decreasing, a contradic-
tion. If (24) holds for innitely many k, then limk!1 V (qk) = 0 by (24). Be-
cause V (qk)  w
 
pG (qk)

, limk!1 w
 
pG (qk)

= 0. Thus ak ! a < 1 where
a := sup
n
a : w


+(1 )(1 a)

= 0
o
. Then limk!1 qk+1 = limk!1 B (qk) =
limk!1 qkak =
limk!1 qk
a > limk!1 qk, a contradiction.
Therefore, there must be surplus from trade with a good rm. Then trade
must occur with probability 1.
A.2 Proof for the Preliminary Section under Duopoly
In this section we prove lemma 9.
The main reason that V (0; qj) = 0 is that once an agency is known to be
opportunistic, its reputation does not change. The complication in the proof
arises because an agencys value may change with its competitors reputation
even though its own reputation remains the same.
Once we see that V (0; qj) = 0 for all qj , then it is easy to show that
w
 
pBi (q)

= 0 using the same type of argument as that in the monopoly case
because the competitors reputation does not depend on whether agency i gives
a good or bad rating.
It then follows from lemma 28 and the maximum coverage condition that
w
 
p;

= 0.
Lemma 29 V (0; 0) = 0 under duopoly.
Proof. We rst see that if agency i does not rate a rm at a positive fee at all,
then V (0; 0) = 0+V (0; 0), so V (0; 0) = 0. But in a symmetric Markov Perfect
equilibrium, the maximal surplus the two agencies can leave a rm of type v
must be the same because they have equal reputations. Thus competition must
drive rating fee down to an agencys cost to provide a good rating, which is 0.
It then follows that V (0; 0) = 0.
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Lemma 30 V1 (0; 1) = 0.
Proof. Reputation prole does not change regardless of rm type or rating.
Suppose max fw (pm1) : m1 = G1,B1g > 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that w
 
pG1

=
min fw (pm1) > 0 : mi = Gi; Big. Then a bad rm strictly prefers to approach
1 at any fee b1 < w
 
pG1

. Thus in equilibrium, a bad rm approaches 1 with
probability 1. Thus 1  . Thus it cannot be the case that w
 
pG1

w
 
pB1

>
0. It follows that w
 
pB1

= 0 and securities wont be issued if agency 1 issues
a bad rating. But then agency 1 will publish G1 for a bad rm with proba-
bility 1, because cost is 0 and 1 gets w
 
pG1

> 0 in the current period i¤ 1
publishes a good rating. Thus pG1   and w  pG1 = 0, contradiction. Thus
max fw (pmi) : mi = Gi,Big = 0 and 1 does not get paid in the current period.
Thus V (0; 1) = 0 + V (0; 1). So V (0; 1) = 0.
Lemma 31 V (0; q i) = 0 for all q i 2 [0; 1].
Proof. It su¢ ces to consider q i 2 (0; 1). Suppose to the contrary that
V (0; q i) > 0. If  i does not publish a rating for any rm in equilibrium,
then the reputation prole does not change. Then the same rationale for prov-
ing that V1 (0; 1) = 0 can be used to show that V (0; q i) = 0, contradiction.
Thus  i must publish a rating for a rm with positive probability.
Because q i > 0, 
G ig
 i > 0. Thus
cg i = V i
 
B ig
  V i  G ig
= V i
 
B ig
  V i G ig i ; 0
< V i
 
B ig
  0
= V i
 
B ig
  V i (0; 0)
 V i
 
B ib
  V i (0; 0)
= cb i.
Therefore the cost for  i to publish a good rating is strictly higher when the rm
is bad than when the rm is good. [Once  i lies, value becomes V (0; 0) = 0.]
Thus, w
 
pB i

= 0. Suppose that w
 
pG i
   w  p; < cg i. Then the cost
for  i to give a good rating is higher than the maximum rating fee at which a
rm is willing to accept, and thus an opportunistic agency  i will give a good
rating with probability 0. But then a good rating must come from an honest
agency  i, and is given only to a good rm, and a bad rating may come from
an opportunistic agency  i. Thus pG i = 1 and G ig i = 1 > B i i . Thus
cg i  0  w (1)   w
 
p;

= w
 
pG1
   w  p;, contradiction to the hypothesis.
Then w
 
pG i
  w  p;  cg i.
Claim 32 w
 
pG i
  w  p; > cg i
Proof. We have shown that w
 
pG i
  w  p;  cg i. Suppose equality holds.
Then w
 
pG i
   w  p; < cb i. Because a rm does not approach  i at any
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rating fee  i > w
 
pG i

, either no bad rm approaches  i, or  i gives al-
ways gives a bad rating to a bad rm, i.e. x i = 0. Thus either B i is o¤
the equilibrium path, or B i i  q i, and equality holds i¤ y i = 1 or good
rm never approaches  i. If B i is o¤ equilibrium path, then  i must rate a
good rm with positive probability and gives a good rm a good rating with
probability 1, in which case G ig i = q i. If 
B i
 i = q i, then either y

 i = 1
and thus G ig i = q i or y

 i < 1 but a good rm does not approach  i. If
B i is o¤ path of if y i = 1,  is reputation does not change in equilibrium.
If a good rm does not approach  i, then G i is o¤ path and G ig i = q i
and  is reputation does not change on path either. By previous arguments,
Vi (0; q i) = 0, contradiction. Thus it must be the case that 
B i
 i < q i and a
good rm approaches  i with positive probability.
Thus y i < 1 and w
 
pG i

= w (1). Then G ig i > q i > 
B i
 i and
w (1)   w  p; = V i 0; B i i    V i 0; G ig i . Then w  p; = 0 because
otherwise, a good rm strictly prefers getting no rating to paying w (1) w  p;
for a good rating with probability y i < 1. But then
w (1) = V i

0; 
B i
 i

  V i

0; 
G ig
 i

< V i

0; 
B i
 i

 max


1  w (1) ; 

1  w (1)

,
i.e.
1  
1   .
We thus obtain a contradiction because 1  < 1.
Claim 33 w
 
pB i

= 0.
Proof. If agency  i loses its reputation, then its value is V (0; 0) = 0. There-
fore, cost of a good rating is higher for a bad rm. The same rationale for the
monopoly case applies.
Claim 34 Reputation of agency  i remains q i if the rm is good.
Proof. If agency  i rates a good rm with zero probability, then pG i = 0
because we have shown that  i must publish a rating with positive probability.
Thus w
 
pG i
   w  p;  0 < V i 0; B i i    V (0; 0) = cb i,  i will never
give a good rating to a bad rm at any fee that a bad rm will accept. Thus

B i
 i = q i and the only rating  i publishes on path is B i. Therefore repu-
tation proles do not change regardless of rm type and rating, contradiction.
Thus  i must rate a good seller with positive probability. If w  pB i > 0,
Because w
 
pG i
  w  p; > cg i, by the key lemma, if agency  i rates a good
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rm with positive probability, it must give good rating to a good rm with
probability 1. and thus y i = 1. Therefore, 
G ig
 i = q i. So conditional on a
good rm, reputation prole does not change.
Claim 35 V (0; q i) = V

0; 
B i
 i

where B i i > q i and  2

0; 1  1 1 

.
Proof. Let  i denote the probability a bad rm approaches  i. After a bad
rm approaches  i, either  i lies and both agencies have zero reputation, or  i
does not lie and the reputation prole becomes

0; 
B i
 i

. If a bad rm does
not approach  i, then reputation prole remains (0; q i) whether or not i rates
the bad rm. Thus, if i does not rate a rm with positive probability, or if i
does not rate a bad rm at a positive fee with positive probability,
V (0; q i)
= V (0; q i)
+ (1  ) 
"  
1   i

V (0; q i) +  i (1  q i)x iV (0; 0)
+ i
 
1  (1  q i)x i

V

0; 
B i
 i
 # .
Because V (0; 0) = 0,
V (0; q i)
=
(1  ) 
1     (1  )   1   i i  1  (1  q i)x iV

0; 
B i
 i

.
We are done because (1 )
1  (1 )(1  i)
 i
 
1  (1  q i)x i

belongs to

0; 1  1 1 

.
If i rates a bad rm at a positive fee with positive probability, then we have
max

w
 
pGi

; w
 
pBi
	
> w
 
p;

because otherwise it is not a best response
for a bad rm to pay a positive fee for is rating. Then i must rate a good rm
with positive probability. We have shown that  i must rate a good rm with
positive probability. Because reputation proles are the same no matter who
rates the good rm, an agency strictly prefers the business of a good rm as
long as it gets positive fee. Thus in equilibrium of Bertrand competition, both
must charge a fee equal to their cost of providing a good rating, and leave the
same surplus to a good rm. Because i has zero cost to provide a good rating,
i must charge zero fee to a good rm and
yi  w
 
pGi

+ (1  yi )w
 
pBi

= w
 
pG i
  cg i.
If a bad rm never approaches  i, or if x i = 0, reputation prole remain
(0; q i) conditional on a bad rm no matter who the bad rm approaches in
equilibrium. But then V (0; q i) = 0, contradiction. So it must be that a bad
rm approaches  i with positive probability and x i > 0. By the key lemma,
either w
 
pG i

= cb i, or x

 i = 1. If x

 i = 1, then after a bad rm approaches
 i,  is reputation becomes either 1 or 0. Thus is payo¤ becomes 0 because
Vi (0; 1) = Vi (0; 0) = 0. So i strictly prefers rating a bad rm at any fee because
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after rating a bad rm is future payo¤ is Vi (0; q i) > 0 by hypothesis. Thus
it must be that bi = 0 because otherwise, i can lower fee to attract a bad rm.
Contradiction to the hypothesis that i rates a bad rm at a positive fee with
positive probability.
So w
 
pG i
  w  p; = cb i = V i  B i ; 0 and x i 2 (0; 1). Then
xiw
 
pGi

+ (1  xi )w
 
pBi
  bi = w  pG i  b i = w p; .
Because xiw
 
pGi

+(1  xi )w
 
pBi

> 0 and i has zero cost of providing a good
rating, i can charge a lower but still positive fee to a bad rm to steal business
from agency  i. If i rates a bad rm with positive probability which is not 1 in
equilibrium, then i must be indi¤erent between rating a bad rm and not rating
a bad rm. That i denote the probability that a bad rm approaches i, then
bi + Vi (0; q i) = 
0@ 1 i  i1 i V (0; q i) +  i1 i (1  q i)x iV (0; 0)
+
 i
1 i
 
1  (1  q i)x i

Vi

0; 
B i
 i
 1A .
Thus
Vi (0; q i) = V (0; q i)
+ (1  ) 
0@ 1 i  i1 i V (0; q i) +  i1 i (1  q i)x iV (0; 0)
+
 i
1 i
 
1  (1  q i)x i

Vi

0; 
B i
 i
 1A .
Because V (0; 0) = 0,
V (0; q i) =
(1  )   i1 i
 
1  (1  q i)x i

1     (1  )  1 i  i1 i
Vi

0; 
B i
 i

.
We are done because
(1 )  i1 i (1 (1 q i)x

 i)
1  (1 ) 1 i  i1 i
2

0; 1  1 1 

. Because x i 2
(0; 1) and y i = 1, 
B i
 i > q i.
Proof. We can now prove lemma 31. Write B i i = q
1. Thus V (0; q i) =
1V
 
0; q1

for some 1 2 (0; 1). It follows that V
 
0; q1

> 0. Thus there exists
q2 > q1 such that V
 
0; q1

= 2V
 
0; q2

. By induction, we can construction
a strictly increasing sequence

qk
	1
k=0
in [0; 1] with q0 = q i. Because the
maximum fee an agency can possibly receive is w (1), V (q)  w(1)1  . Thus
V (0; q i) =
 
KY
k=1
k
!
V
 
0; qK


 
KY
k=1
k
!
w (1)
1  
<

1  1  
1  
K
w (1)
1  
38
for all K = 1; 2; :::. Thus
V (0; q i)  lim
K!1

1  1  
1  
K
w (1)
1  
= 0.
Contradiction. Therefore, V (0; q i) = 0.
A.3 Proofs For the Active Agency Lemma
Proof for lemma 15.
I nish the rest of the cases.
If w
 
pGi

> V

Bii ; qj

but w
 
pGj

= V


Bj
j ; qi

, then by the zero-
surplus lemma (lemma 12), xi = 1. Thus, a

i = qi and 
Bi
i = 1. Agency i
then prefers to rate a bad rm at any fee because the future value resulting
from giving a bad rating is weakly higher than that from any other possible
reputation prole, particularly the value after the bad rm obtains no rating
or a rating from its competitor. The preference is strict if i charges more than
V

Bii ; qj

. Therefore, in equilibrium, a bad rm must be rated by agency i
with probability 1, because agency i can give a positive surplus to a bad rm,
whereas agency j can only give zero surplus. But then a good rm must also
be rated by agency i with probability 1, because otherwise, w
 
pGj

= w (1) >
V (1)  V


Bj
j ; qi

, contradicting the hypothesis. Thus, agency i is the only
active agency, and both types of rm obtain is rating with probability 1.
To show that i = 1, I demonstrate that the active agency must have a higher
value than the inactive agency. Because agency i can always give a bad rating
and get V (1) from the resulting future reputation, Vi (q)  V (1). I now
establish that agency j must have a lower value. Suppose the rm is bad. If
agency i is opportunistic, agency i will lie for sure and lose all of its reputation,
and thus agency j becomes a monopolist and earns V (qj) from the next period
onwards. On the other hand, if agency i is honest, agency i will give a bad
rating and become believed to be honest, and thus agency js future value will
be zero. When the rm is good, future reputation prole remains unchanged.
Thus Vj (q) =
(1 )(1 qi)
1  V (qj) < V (1)  Vi (q). Because leading agency has
a higher value, i = 1.
When w
 
pGi

> V

Bii ; qj

for i = 1; 2, then xi = 1 by the zero-surplus
lemma (lemma 12), and thus Bii = 1, for i = 1; 2. Suppose to the contrary
that agency 2 is active. Then it must be the case that w
 
pG2

> w
 
pG1

so
that the maximal surplus agency 2 can leave a good rm is at least as big that
agency 1 can leave. Because an agency earns perfect reputation after issuing a
bad rating, it prefers rating a bad rm to letting its competitor or no agency
rate it. Thus, it will also compete for a bad rms business by driving rating fee
down to cost if necessary. Because an honest agency does not lie, the maximal
39
surplus agency i can leave a bad rm is
(1  qi)
 
w
 
pGi
  V (1) .
If w
 
pG2

> w
 
pG1

, then a bad rm must approach agency 2 with probability
1 in equilibrium. If agency 1 is active, then it rates only good rms, and thus
w
 
pG1

= w (1) > w
 
pG2

, a contradiction. Thus, agency 1 must be inactive.
But, using the same argument as in the previous case, the inactive agency must
have a lower value than the active agency, another contradiction.
A.4 Proofs that the Value of Reputation Goes Down
First I show that value of reputation for the trailing agency is lower under
duopoly.
Claim 36 V (q2; q1) < V (q2) for all q1 > q2 and (q1; q2) 2 (0; 1)2.
Proof. More specically, when the rm is bad, with probability a1 = 1  
(1  q1)x1, agency 1 will give it a bad rating, and its reputation will rise to
B11 =
q1
a1
; but, with probability 1  a1, agency 1 will lie, and its reputation will
drop to zero. If the rm is good, or if this bad rm does not obtain a rating,
reputation prole does not change. Thus,
V (r; q) =
(1  ) (q; r)
1     (1  )  (1   (q; r))


a (q; r)V

r;
q
a (q; r)

+ (1  a (q; r))V (r)

< a (q; r)V

r;
q
a (q; r)

+ (1  a (q; r))V (r) .
Dene q0 = q. Given qk < 1, dene qk+1 =
qk
a(qk;r)
. Then, for all k, there exists 
k0 ; :::
k
k

such that
Pk
j=0 
k
0 = 1 and
V (r; q) <
0@k 1X
j=0
kj
1AV (r) + kkV (r; qk) .
If there existsK such that qK = 1, then V (r; q) < V (r). Otherwise, limk!1 qk =
q < 1 and limk!1 a (qk; r) = 1 and w
 
pG1 (qk; r)

= V (qk+1; r). Because the
leading agency cannot charge more than the value of its good rating,
V (qk; r) 
(+ (1  ) (qk; r))w
 
pG1

1     (1  )  (1   (qk; r))
=
(+ (1  ) (qk; r)) V (qk+1; r)
1     (1  )  (1   (qk; r))
<

1  1   (1 + )
1   + (1  ) 

V (qk+1; r) .
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But then, V (qk; r) =

1  1 (1+)1 +(1 )
 k
V (q; r)  V (1) for all k, and thus
V (q; r) = 0 because 1 (1+)1 +(1 ) 2 (0; 1), a contradiction.
Next I show that the leading agency lies for sure and a bad rm obtains a
rating for sure when q1  M1 .
Proof for Claim 18. When q1 2 [M1 ; 1), by denition of M1 , agency 1s
reputation is su¢ ciently high that even if the opportunistic agency 1 lies for
sure, the value of its good rating is still higher than the discounted value of
even a perfect reputation V (1). It is even higher if a bad rm may not obtain
a rating from agency 1 because this scenario improves the average quality of the
rms rated by agency 1. Thus, agency 1 lies for sure, as under monopoly, and
is able to leave a positive surplus for a bad rm. In addition, agency 1 strictly
prefers to rate a bad rm at any b1 > V (1) because rating a bad rm gives
w
 
pG1

> V (1), which is at least as good as the discounted future value. So,
a bad rm must obtain a rating from agency 1 with probability 1. Thus, the
value of agency 1s good rating is w
 
pG1 (q)

= w


+(1 )(1 q1)

, which is the
same as when agency 1 is the monopolist. Because the reputation prole does
not change when the rm is good,
V1 (q) 
w
 
pG1 (q)
  V2 (q)
1  
< V (q1) .
Now I can prove lemma 16.
Proof for Lemma 16. If q1  M1 , then by claim 18 and inequality (13),
V1 (q) 
w


+(1 )(1 q1)

  V2 (q)
1   .
Because V2 (q) > 0, V1 (q) < V (q1).
For q1 < M1 , when the project is bad, there can be only zero marginal
surplus from agency 1s good rating because if agency 1 can give a positive
surplus to a bad rm, by the zero surplus lemma (12) , it will lie for sure, and
B11 = 1. But then a bad rm will approach agency 1 with probability 1; thus
w
 
pG1

= w


+ (1  ) (1  q1)

< V (1)
= V1
 
B1

,
a contradiction. Hence, in equilibrium, agency 1s good rating has zero marginal
surplus when the rm is bad, i.e.,
w
 
pG1 (q)

= w


+ (1  )1 (q) (1  a1 (q))

= V1

q1
a1 (q)
; q2

.
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In addition, agency 2s good rating must also have zero marginal surplus when
the rm is bad; otherwise agency 2 will rate bad rms and only bad rms in
equilibrium and 2 = 0, a contradiction to hypothesis that there is positive
surplus. Thus, the discount that agency 1 gives a good rm is V2 (q). Because
agency 1 is indi¤erent between lying and not lying, its equilibrium payo¤ is
V1 (q) =
(+ (1  )1)  w
 
pG1 (q)
  V2 (q)
1     (1  ) (1  1) 
.
Because 1  < 1, to show that V1 (q) < V (q1), it su¢ ces to show that the
value of agency 1s good rating is lower under duopoly.
Suppose there exists q1 > q2, where (q1; q2) 2 (0; 1), such that
V1 (q)  V (q1) .
We can construct a sequence
 
qk1 ; q
k
2
	
k
such that this holds for all k and
qk+1 > qk. This sequence is nite if there exists K such that V1 (q) < V (q1) for
all q > qK . Dene q := qK if it is nite and q := limk!1 qk if the sequence is
innite.
By lemma 10, a (q) < 1. Thus, there exists q^ 2 qk	 such that q^1 2
(q1  a (q1) ; q1] and V1 (q^)  V (q^1). For all a1  a (q1), where a (q1) is the
equilibrium accuracy when the monopolists reputation isq1
w


+ (1  ) (1  a1)

 w


+ (1  ) (1  a (q1))

= V

q1
a (q1)

> V

q^1
a (q1)

> V

q^1
a (q1)
; q^2

because q^1a(q1) > q1 and by denition of q. So, a
 (q^1; q^2) < a (q1).
If 1 (q^) = 1, then w
 
pG1 (q^)

= w


+(1 )(1 a(q^))

< w


+(1 )(1 a(q1))

.
It follows that V1 (q^) < V (q^1). If 1 (q^) < 1, by the maximum coverage condi-
tion, then agency 1 must weakly prefers the bad rm to obtain no rating or to
approach agency 2. If no rating is issued, then the reputation prole remains
unchanged. Thus, if agency 1 prefers no rating to be issued to rating a bad rm,
then
V1 (q^) 
(+ (1  )1)w
 
pG1 (q^)

1     (1  ) (1  1) 
 (+ (1  )1) V1 (q^)
1     (1  ) (1  1) 
< V1 (q^) ,
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a contradiction. Thus agency 1 must weakly prefer a bad rm to obtain a rating
from agency 2. Hence,
V1 (q^) 
(+ (1  )1)w
 
pG1 (q^)

1     (1  ) (1  1) 


1  1   (1 + )
1   + (1  ) 

(1  a2 (q^))V (q^1) + a2 (q^)V

q^1;
q^2
a2 (q^)

.
If q^2a2(q^) > q^1, then by claim 36, V

q^1;
q^2
a2(q^)

< V (q^1) and we are nished.
Therefore, V1 (q^)  V (q^1) only if V1

q^1;
q^2
a2(q^)

> V (q^1) and
q^2
a2(q^)
 q^1. Then,
we can construct a sequence

q^k
	
k
where q^k1 = q^1 for all k and q^
0
2 = q^2 and
q^k+12 =
q^k2
a2(q^k)
 q^1 such that V1
 
q^k+1

> V1
 
q^k
  V (q^1) for all k  0. Then
limk!1 a2
 
q^k

= limk!1
q^k2
q^k+12
= 1 and limk!1 V1
 
q^k

> V (q^1). Thus,
lim
k!1
V1
 
q^k
  1  1   (1 + )
1   + (1  ) 

lim
k!1
V1
 
q^k+1

.
But 1 (1+)1 +(1 ) > 0, a contradiction. Hence, there exists no q1  q2 such that
V1 (q1; q2)  V (q1).
A.5 Proofs for Equilibrium Construction
A.5.1 Behaviors On the Equilibrium Path
Proof for Claim 21. The LHS of (22) is continuously increasing and the
right hand side is continuously decreasing in a. In addition,
w
0B@ 
+ (1  )

1  
D
k+1(q2)
Dk (q2)

1CA =  ~V  Dk ; q2 <  ~V
 
q1
Dk+1 (q2)
Dk
!
,
and strict inequality holds in the opposite direction when a = ~a
 
Dk (q2) ; q2

=
Dk (q2)
Dk 1(q2)
. Thus, a unique solution exists and belongs to

~a
 
Dk+1 (q2) ; q2

; ~a
 
Dk (q2) ; q2

:
It follows that q1~a(q1;q2) > 
D
k (q2). By hypothesis, the RHS decreases with q2
and increases in q1. Thus, ~a (q1; q2) decreases in q2 and increases in q1. In
addition, q1~a(q1;q2) = ~
B (q1; q2) increases with q1 and decreases with q2.
Claim 37  (r) is well-dened and continuous for all r 2 I.
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Proof. The left hand side is strictly increasing in  because the reputation
earned by giving a bad rating, ~a(;r) = 
B1
1 (; r), is strictly increasing in the
agencys own reputation. The right hand side is strictly decreasing in  because
@
@
8<:
1 (1 )+(1 )1
+(1 )1
(1 )
1  (1 )+(1 )1
 (1  a (; r))
h
V (r) +
a(;r) r
1 a(;r) r V

r; a(;r)
i 9=;
=  1  (1  )  + (1  ) 1
+ (1  ) 1
(1  ) 
1     (1  )  + (1  ) 1


((1  ) )
(+ (1  ) 1) (1     (1  )  + (1  ) 1)


 
(1  ) (1  ) (1  (1 )+(1 )1)1 (1 )+(1 )1
+ (1 (1 )+(1 )1)(+(1 )1)1 (1 )+(1 )1
!

0B@ 

1  r

@a
@ + (1  a) r a
1  a ( (r) ; r) r(r)
2
1CA (1  a)

"
V (r) +
a (; r) r
1  a (; r) r
V

r;

a (; r)
#
 
8<:
1 (1 )+(1 )1
+(1 )1
(1 )
1  (1 )+(1 )1

h
@a
@

V (r) +
a(;r) r
1 a(;r) r V

r; a(;r)

+ ::
i 9=;
<
1  (1  )  + (1  ) 1
+ (1  ) 1
(1  ) 
1     (1  )  + (1  ) 1
@a
@
 
V (r) +
a (; r) r
1  a (; r) r
V

r;

a (; r)
!

"
1  a
1  a r
1  r
1  a r
 
(1  ) (1  ) (1  (1 )+(1 )1)1 (1 )+(1 )1
+ (1 (1 )+(1 )1)(+(1 )1)1 (1 )+(1 )1
!
  1
#
<
1  (1  )  + (1  ) 1
+ (1  ) 1
(1  ) 
1     (1  )  + (1  ) 1
@a
@
 
V (r) +
a (; r) r
1  a (; r) r
V

r;

a (; r)
!
 [(1  ) (1  ) + + (1  ) 1   1]
< 0.
When r 2 I, LHS<RHS for  = sup
n
q1 : ~V (q1; q2)  ~V (q2; q1)
o
, and LHS >
RHS for  = M1 . So there exists a unique  (r) such that equality holds. In
addition, by the implicit function theorem,  (r) is continuous in r.
Claim 38 Agency i is indi¤erent between lying and not lying at (r; r), for any
r 2 (0; 1).
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Proof. By denition and continuity, pG (r; r) = limq1!r+ p
G (q1; r) and B (r; r) =
limq1!r+ 
B (q1; r). Thus
w


+ (1  ) (r; r) (1  a (r; r))

= lim
q1!r+
w


+ (1  ) (q1; r) (1  a (q1; r))

= lim
q1!r+
V

q1
a (q1; r)
; r

= V

r
a (r; r)
; r

.
The last equality is established by continuity in lemma 23. Hence, at x (r; r)
so dened, agency 1 is indi¤erent between lying and not lying.
A.5.2 Properties of the Value Function
Claim 39 @V@q1 (q1; q2) > 0, but
@V
@q1
(q2; q1) < 0 for (q1; q2) 2 A.
Proof. Plugging the leading agencys equilibrium accuracy a and  into (15),
the value of business for a trailing agency is
V (q2; q1)
=
(1  ) 
1   + (1  ) (q1; q2) 

"
(1  a ( (q2) ; q2))V (q2)
+
(1 a((q2);q2))a((q2);q2) q(q2)
1 a((q2);q2) q1(q2)
V

r; (q2)a((q2);q2)
 # .
For q1 2 (q2;  (q2)), the leading agencys equilibrium accuracy does not depend
on the leading agencys reputation, and thus the probability of the trailing
rm becoming a monopolist does not depend on q1. But, the probability of
the leading agency being approached by a bad rm increases with q1. So, the
45
trailing agencys value decreases with its competitors reputation:
@V (q2; q1)
@q
=
(1  ) 
1   + (1  )1
(1  a (; q2))
a(;q2)

1  a q
2V q2; a (; q2)

  (1  ) 
1   + (1  )1
(1  a (; q2)) a
1  a q
2 V (r; q)
=
(1  ) 
1   + (1  )1
(1  a (; q2))
a(;q2)

1  a q
2

"
V

q2;

a(;q2)

  V (q2; )
+V (q2; )  a (; q2)
#
Write  (q2) = q^. Then,
@V (r;q^)
@q < 0 because  (q^; r) = q^. Let q0 be the largest
q such that @V (q2;q1)@q1  0; then by continuity,
@V (q2;q0)
@q1
= 0 and q0 < q^. Then,
V (q2;  (q2)) V (q2; q0) =
R (q2)
q=q0
@V (q2;q1)
@q1
dq1 < 0. But then,
@V (q2;q1)
@q1
jq=q0 < 0
because V (q2;  (q2))  V (q2; q0) < 0, a contradiction. So, @V (q2;q1)@q1 < 0 for all
q1 2 (q2;  (q2)).
The value of business for the leading agency is
V (q1; q2) =
(+ (1  )1)w

1
1+ 1  (1 a((q2);q2))

  V (q2; q1)
1   + (1  )1
.
Given the competitors reputation, the value of the leading agencys good rating
does not change with its own reputation, for q 2 (q2;  (q2)). So, the fee it
charges a bad rm does not change with its own reputation, but the probability
of it being approached by a bad rm increases with its own reputation. In
addition, the fee it charges a good rm increases with its own reputation, because
when its reputation is better, the competitor derives a lower value and thus is
less of a threat in competing for a good rm. We can immediately see that the
leading agencys value increases with its own reputation.
Claim 40 For r 2 I, limq1!r+ V (q1; r) = limq2!r  V (q2; r) = V (r; r).
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Proof. Write 1 (r
+; r) = 1 a
((r);r)
1 a((r);r) r . By the construction of  (r),
lim
q1!r+
(V (q1; r)  V (r; q1))
=
(+ (1  )1 (r+; r)) V


~a((r);r) ; r

   limq1!r+ V (r; q1)
1   + (1  )1 (r+; r) 
  lim
q1!r+
V (r; q1)
=
(
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r))) V


~a((r);r) ; r

  (1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) ) limq1!r+ V (r; q1)
)
1   + (1  )1 (r+; r) 
= 0.
Thus, V (r; r) = limq1!r+ V (q1; r). Because both  (:) and ~a
 (:; :) are continu-
ous,
lim
q2!r 
1 (r; q2) =
1  a ( (q2) ; q2)
1  a ( (q2) ; q2) r(q2)
=
1  a ( (r) ; r)
1  a ( (r) ; r) r(r)
= lim
q1!r+
 (q1; r) :
Thus,
lim
q2!r 
V (r; q2)
= lim
q2!r 
8>><>>:
(1 )
1 +(1 )1(r;q2)

 
(1  a ( (q2) ; q2))V (q2)
+
(1 a((q2);q2))a((q2);q2) r(q2)
1 a((q2);q2) r(q2)
V

q2;
(q2)
a((q2);q2)
 !
9>>=>>;
=
(1  ) 
1   + (1  )  limq1!r+  (q1; r) 

"
(1  a ( (r) ; r))V (r)
+
(1 a((r);r))a((r);r) r
(r)
1 a((r);r) r
(r)
#
V

r;
 (r)
a ( (r) ; r)

= lim
q1!r+
V (q1; r) .
A.5.3 Behaviors O¤ the Equilibrium Path
Lemma 42 in Appendix A.5.5 shows that we can construct ( (q2; q1) ; x (q2; q1)),
the trailing agencys probability of lying, and investorsbelief about projects
rated by the trailing agency, such that agency 2 can leave only zero surplus for
a bad rm and both types of agency 2 prefer a bad rm to approach it to the
rm obtaining no rating.
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I will nish the description of the equilibrium by establishing the players
behaviors when the proposed fee prole is not on the equilibrium path.
When the rm with a type v project approaches agency i after i proposes
i 6= vi , agency i gives a good rating if and only if i  cvi .
Given a fee prole (1; 2) and y (:) dened previously, by approaching
agency i, a good rm expects to receive a surplus of
Ugi (; q) =

w
 
pGi
  i if i  cgi
 (i; q) 
 
w
 
pGi
   if i < cgi ,
because when the rating fee is below agency is cost, only an honest agency i
will give a good rating. Let a good rms belief about agency i be given by
g (i; q) =
8<: qi if i  c
g (qi; qj)
min

qi;
V (qi;qj)
qi+1
2
w(pG(qi;qj)) i

otherwise
.
It is continuous in i. Let  (:) be such that  (1; 2; q) = 1 if U
g
1 (; q) 
max fUg2 (; q) ; 0g and  (2; 1; q) = 1 if Ug2 (; q) > Ug1 (; q) and Ug2 (; q)  0,
and  (1; 2; q) =  (2; 1; q) = 0 otherwise.
Let a bad rms belief about rm i to be b (i; q) = qi for all i  0.
If agency 1 charges 1 = w
 
pG (q1; q2)

, then a bad rm approaches it with
probability  (q1; q2), and obtains no rating with probability 1   (q1; q2). If
agency 1 charges 1 2 [V
 
B (q1; q2) ; w
 
pG (q1; q2)

where 1 6= b (q1; q2),
then the bad rm obtains a rating from it with probability 1. Otherwise, the
bad rm obtains a rating from agency 1 with probability 0. In addition, if
2 2 [V
 
B (q2; q1) ; w
 
pG (q2; q1)

and 2 6= b (q2; q1), then the bad rm
obtains a rating from agency 2 with probability 1, but if 2 = w
 
pG (q2; q1)

,
then it does so with probability " (q1; q2) such that
"V t (1) + (1  ")V t (q1; q2) < V t

q1
a (q1; q2)
; q2

, (27)
where V t denotes the equilibrium payo¤ for a type t agency 1. Such an " exists
because the value for both types of the leading agency value is strictly increasing
in its own reputation (lemma 39 in Section 3.6.3 and lemma 43 in Appendix
A.5.5).
A.5.4 Verication of Equilibrium Conditions
By construction, xand y are optimal for an agency given the equilibrium fee.
x (:) and y (:) are constructed to maximize an agencys intertemporal payo¤s.
Because V (q1; q2) > V (q2; q1) and agency 2 cannot leave positive a surplus
for a bad rm,  and  are a good and bad rms best response at the
equilibrium fee prole. The behaviors  (:) and  (:) for o¤-the-equilibrium-
path fee proles are constructed to be optimal.
By construction of  (q2; q1), agency 2 weakly prefers a bad rm to obtain
a rating from himself to it obtaining no rating. Thus the rating fee agency
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2 charges as dened by (17) is nonnegative. Because the surplus a good rm
expects from agency 2 is maximized when agency 2 charges its equilibrium fee,
g (q2; q1) is optimal and weakly undominated for agency 2. Because a bad rm
does not approach agency 2 when agency 1 charges its equilibrium fee, agency 2
is indi¤erent between all fees it charges. By the construction of w
 
pG (q2; q1)

and  (; q2; q1), charging (18) to a bad rm is not weakly dominated for agency
2 because agency 2 weakly prefers rating a bad rm to the outcome when no
rating is given.
When the rm is good, on the equilibrium path, agency 1 receives a positive
rating fee by giving a good rating because
V
 
B (q1; q2)

= V

q1
a (q1; q2)
; q2

> V (q1; q2)
> V (q2; q1) ,
and the future reputation prole is the same no matter which agency rates the
good rm. Thus, g (q1; q2) dened by (17) is optimal for both types of agency
1. When the rm is bad, by charging the equilibrium fee, agency 1 has the
option of giving a bad rating and earning future value from reputation prole
q1
a(q1;q2)
; q2

. Given that agency 2 charges the equilibrium fee, by leaving a
smaller surplus for the bad rm, the rm will obtain no rating with probability
1 " (q1; q2), and a rating from agency 2 with probability " (q1; q2). By (27) and
the construction of  (:), the fee b (q1; q2) dened by (18) is optimal for both
types of agency 1.
By lemma 24, the leading agency always has a higher value than the trailing
agency. The following claim implies that when the rm has a bad project, for
all q 2 A, agency 1 prefers the rm to obtain a rating from the trailing agency.
Because  (q) = 1 for all q =2 A, maximum coverage condition is also satised.
Claim 41 For all q2 2 I and q1 2 (q2;  (q2)),
w
 
pG (q1; q2)

< (1  a (q2; q1))V (q1) + a (q2; q1)V

q1;
q2
a (q2; q1)

:
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Proof. By denition,
w
 
pG (q; r)

= V


a (; r)
; r

=
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) )
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)))
(1  )
1     (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) 

"
(1  a (; r)) V (r) +
(1  a (; r)) a (; r) r
1  a (; r) r
V

r;

a (; r)
#
<

(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) )
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)))
(1  )1 (r+; r)
1     (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) 

 (1  r) V (r)
< (1  r) V (r) .
because
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) )
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)))
(1  )1 (r+; r)
1     (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) 
=

1 +
(1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) (1  )
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)))

1  (1  ) (1  (1  )1)
1   + (1  ) 1 (r+; r)

=

1 +
(1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)) (1  )
(1  (1  ) (1  1 (r+; r)))

1  (1  ) (+ (1  ) (1  1))
1   + (1  ) 1 (r+; r)

< 1
Because a2  r and V (q1; q02) < V (q1) for all q02, w
 
pG (q; r)

< (1  a2) V (q)+
a2V

q; ra2

.
In equilibrium, an agency gives nonnegative surplus to a rm, and a rm is
indi¤erent between both agencies. In addition,  (qi; qj) 2 (0; 1) for all (qi; qj) 2
[0; 1]
2. Consistency follows immediately.
Thus, the strategy proles and beliefs constructed constitute an equilibrium
in which the leading agency has higher value.
A.5.5 More Detailed Proofs for Behaviors O¤The Equilibrium Path
Conditions
Lemma 42 There exists  (q2; q1) and a (q2; q1) on C such that
w

2 (q2; q1)
 (q2; q1) + (1   (q2; q1)) (1  a (q2; q1))

= V

q2
a (q2; q1)
; q1

,
V

q2
a (q2; q1)
; q1

 V (q2; q1) ,
and
V h

q2
a (q2; q1)
; q1

 V h (q2; q1) .
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Proof. For q1 > q2 > M1 , dene  (q2; q1) = 2 such that w

2
2+(1 2)(1 q2)

=
V (1). So,
2 =
1
1 +
(w 1( 1V (1) ))
 1 1
1 q2
.
Also dene x (q2; q1) = 1.
For q1 =2 I, dene  (q1) to be q^2 such that
w
0@ 
+ (1  )

1  q^2q1

1A = lim
q01!q+1
V (q01; q1) .
Then, for q2 2 ( (q1) ; q1), dene ~ (q2; q1) = , and ~a (q2; q1) to be the solution
to
w


+ (1  ) (1  a)

= V
q2
a
; q1

.
Because q2 >  (q1), and V
 
q2
a ; q1

is decreasing in a for all a < q2q1 , a unique
solution in

q2;
q2
q1

exists. Dene ~a (q2; q1) = q2q1 , and
~ (q2; q1) = 2 to be such
that
w
0@ 2
2 + (1  2)

1   (q1)q1

1A = V (q1; q1) .
For q2 <  (q1), dene ~ (q2; q1) = 2 to be the solution to
w
0@ 2
2 + (1  2)

1   (q1)q1

1A = lim
q02!q 1
V (q02; q1) .
Dene ~a (q2; q1) to be the solution a to
w
0@ ~ (q2; q1)
~ (q2; q1) +

1  ~ (q2; q1)

(1  a)
1A = V  q2
a
; q1

. (28)
Because q2 <  (q1), and V
 
q2
a ; q1

is strictly decreasing for a > q2q1 , there
exists a unique solution in

q2
q1
; 1

.
For q1 2 I, dene ~ (q2; q1) := +(1 )(q1;q2) . Dene ~a (q2; q1) to be the
smallest solution to (28). Because V (r; q1) is continuous in r on [0; 1], and
a (q1; q2) > q1,
w


+ (1  ) (q1; q2) (1  a (q1; q2))

< V (1) .
Thus, strict inequality holds for a = a (q1; q2) > q1 and for a = q2 and thus
a solution exists in (q2; a (q1; q2)).
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Dene
a1 (q2; q1) := inf
n
a  q2 : V
q2
a0
; q1

 V (q2; q1) ; for all a0  a
o
and
a2 (q2; q1) := inf
n
a  q2 : V h
q2
a0
; q1

 V h (q2; q1) for all a0  a
o
Because V (1; q1) = V (1) > V (q2; q1) and V h (1; q1) = V h (1) > V h (q2; q1)
both functions are well-dened.
Dene a (q2; q1) = min

~a (q2; q1) ; a1 (q2; q1) ; a2 (q2; q1)
	
. Dene  (q2; q1)
to be ~ (q2; q1) if a (q2; q1) = ~a (q2; q1), and dene  (q2; q1) to be such that
(28) holds for a = a (q2; q1) if a (q2; q1) 6= ~a (q2; q1).
Let V h (q) denote an honest agencys payo¤ when the reputation prole is
q.
Lemma 43 @V
h(q1;q2)
@q1
> 0 for all q1 > q2.
Proof. V h (1) = w(1)1  < V (1) and
V h (q1; q2) =
 (g (q1; q2)) + (1  ) V h (1)
1  
for all q1 > M1 because an honest agency does not give a good rating when the
rm is bad. Then V h (q1; q2) is strictly increasing in q1 for q1 > M1 . And
V h (q1; q2)
V (q1; q2)
=
g (q1; q2) + (1  ) V h (1)
g (q1; q2) + (1  ) V (1)
>
V h (1)
V (1)
=
 (1  )
1  
>

1   .
For (q1; q2) 2 CnA,
V h (q1; q2) =

 
V
 
B (q1; q2)

+ (1  ) V h  B (q1; q2)
1  
and
V h (q1; q2)
V (q1; q2)
=
g (q1; q2) + (1  ) V h
 
B (q1; q2)

g (q1; q2) + (1  ) V (B (q1; q2)) .
Because B1 (q1; q2) increases with q1, by induction, V
h (q1; q2) increases with
q1, and
V h (q1; q2)
V (q1; q2)
>
V h
 
B (q1; q2)

V (B (q1; q2))
>

1   .
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For (q1; q2) 2 A,
V h (q1; q2) =

 
V
 
B (q1; q2)

+ (1  )  (q1; q2)V h
 
B (q1; q2)

1   + (1  )  (q1; q2) .
Thus,
@V h (q1; q2)
@q1
=
(1  )  (1  )V h  B (q1; q2)  V  B (q1; q2)
(1   + (1  ) )2
@ (q1; q2)
@q1
> 0
because B (q1; q2) 2 CnA.
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